Wonda MCP Server
@degausai/wonda-mcp
npm
v0.12.0
Published by @degausai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for the Wonda content creation API — images, video, music, audio, editing, and publishing
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Tool "run_now_twin" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_now_twin" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_now_twin
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/local-exec.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/local-exec.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { homedir } from "node:os";
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/local-exec.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/version.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/version.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { resolve, sep } from "node:path"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/version.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([list_content_skills, get_content_skill, get_twin_output, twin_artifact]) co-exist with external-action tools ([run_now_twin]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [list_content_skills, get_content_skill, get_twin_output, twin_artifact] → sinks [run_now_twin]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow list_content_skills → run_now_twin
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "run_now_twin"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "run_now_twin" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool run_now_twin · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "run_now_twin" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_now_twin" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_now_twin
Tools 56
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_content_skillingests untrusted inputget_twin_outputingests untrusted inputlist_content_skillsingests untrusted inputrun_now_twinruns code / shelltwin_artifactingests untrusted inputanalyze_videono sensitive capabilitycancel_twin_runno sensitive capabilitycreate_twin_scheduleno sensitive capabilitydelete_twin_scheduleno sensitive capabilityget_mediano sensitive capability
Show 46 more tools ↓
list_mediano sensitive capabilitylist_twin_runsno sensitive capabilitylist_twin_schedulesno sensitive capabilitylist_twinsno sensitive capabilitypause_twinno sensitive capabilityprovision_twinno sensitive capabilitypublish_instagramno sensitive capabilitypublish_tiktokno sensitive capabilityresume_twinno sensitive capabilityrun_campaignno sensitive capabilityschedule_loopno sensitive capabilitysequence_cancel_runno sensitive capabilitysequence_createno sensitive capabilitysequence_deleteno sensitive capabilitysequence_listno sensitive capabilitysequence_runno sensitive capabilitysequence_runsno sensitive capabilitysequence_scheduleno sensitive capabilitysequence_updateno sensitive capabilitysequence_validateno sensitive capabilityset_twin_limitsno sensitive capabilityshow_twinno sensitive capabilitytwin_action_allowanceno sensitive capabilitytwin_can_actno sensitive capabilitytwin_healthno sensitive capabilitytwin_limitsno sensitive capabilitytwin_livenessno sensitive capabilitytwin_login_automatedno sensitive capabilitytwin_login_statusno sensitive capabilitytwin_needs_auth_viewno sensitive capabilitytwin_seed_from_cookiesno sensitive capabilitytwin_signupno sensitive capabilityupdate_twinno sensitive capabilityupdate_twin_scheduleno sensitive capabilityupload_mediano sensitive capabilitywab_hideno sensitive capabilitywab_login_checkno sensitive capabilitywab_login_openno sensitive capabilitywab_openno sensitive capabilitywab_screenshotno sensitive capabilitywab_showno sensitive capabilitywab_statusno sensitive capabilitywonda_calendarno sensitive capabilitywonda_calendar_dayno sensitive capabilitywonda_statusno sensitive capabilitywonda_whoamino sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (56 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.12.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.10.0 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v0.9.3 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
v0.9.2 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
v0.9.1 |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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