defernowork-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.1
Published by kyle-falconer — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol server for the Deferno task manager backend.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/e2e-bottle/helpers/claude_code.py:86`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: url: str) -> None: subprocess.run( ["claude", "mcp", "add", "--transport", "http", name, url], chec
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/e2e-bottle/helpers/claude_code.py
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/e2e-bottle/test_self.py:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: not on PATH" out = subprocess.run(["claude", "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True) assert out.returncod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/e2e-bottle/test_self.py
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
export_datareads sensitive dataadd_to_items_planno sensitive capabilityadd_to_planno sensitive capabilitybatch_tasksno sensitive capabilityclear_habit_occurrenceno sensitive capabilitycommit_event_occurrence_attachmentsno sensitive capabilitycommit_task_attachmentsno sensitive capabilitycomplete_authno sensitive capabilityconvert_itemno sensitive capabilitycreate_choreno sensitive capabilitycreate_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_habitno sensitive capabilitycreate_saved_searchno sensitive capabilitycreate_taskno sensitive capabilitydelete_choreno sensitive capabilitydelete_commentno sensitive capabilitydelete_eventno sensitive capabilitydelete_event_occurrenceno sensitive capabilitydelete_event_occurrence_attachmentno sensitive capabilitydelete_event_occurrence_commentno sensitive capabilitydelete_habitno sensitive capabilitydelete_saved_searchno sensitive capabilitydelete_taskno sensitive capabilitydelete_task_attachmentno sensitive capabilityfeedback_statsno sensitive capabilityfold_taskno sensitive capabilityget_calendar_eventsno sensitive capabilityget_daily_planno sensitive capabilityget_itemno sensitive capabilityget_item_historyno sensitive capabilityget_items_calendarno sensitive capabilityget_items_planno sensitive capabilityget_mood_historyno sensitive capabilityget_settingsno sensitive capabilityget_tasks_calendarno sensitive capabilityimport_datano sensitive capabilitylist_chore_occurrencesno sensitive capabilitylist_event_occurrence_attachmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_event_occurrencesno sensitive capabilitylist_feedbackno sensitive capabilitylist_habit_occurrencesno sensitive capabilitylist_itemsno sensitive capabilitylist_pinned_tasksno sensitive capabilitylist_saved_searchesno sensitive capabilitylist_task_attachmentsno sensitive capabilitylogoutno sensitive capabilitymark_habit_occurrenceno sensitive capabilitymark_next_chore_doneno sensitive capabilitymerge_taskno sensitive capabilitymove_taskno sensitive capabilitypatch_event_occurrence_commentno sensitive capabilitypost_event_occurrence_commentno sensitive capabilitypresign_event_occurrence_attachmentsno sensitive capabilitypresign_task_attachmentsno sensitive capabilitypromote_taskno sensitive capabilityremove_from_items_planno sensitive capabilityremove_from_planno sensitive capabilityreorder_items_planno sensitive capabilityreorder_pinned_tasksno sensitive capabilityreorder_planno sensitive capabilityreorder_saved_searchesno sensitive capabilityreschedule_chore_occurrenceno sensitive capabilityreschedule_event_occurrenceno sensitive capabilityreschedule_habit_occurrenceno sensitive capabilitysearch_itemsno sensitive capabilityset_chore_occurrence_statusno sensitive capabilityset_event_occurrenceno sensitive capabilityset_item_pinnedno sensitive capabilityset_task_statusno sensitive capabilitysplit_taskno sensitive capabilitystart_authno sensitive capabilityupdate_choreno sensitive capabilityupdate_commentno sensitive capabilityupdate_eventno sensitive capabilityupdate_feedbackno sensitive capabilityupdate_habitno sensitive capabilityupdate_pinned_labelno sensitive capabilityupdate_saved_searchno sensitive capabilityupdate_settingsno sensitive capabilityupdate_taskno sensitive capabilitywhoamino sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.1 latest |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan defernowork-mcp --online --registry pypi
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