Defense MCP Server
defense-mcp-server
npm
v0.9.5
Published by bottobot — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Defense MCP Server — 31 defensive security tools with 250+ actions for system hardening, compliance, and threat detection on Linux
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (build/tools/cloud-security.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/cloud-security.js:28`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rovider: "aws", path: "~/.aws/credentials" }, { provider: "aws", path: "~/.aws/config" }, { provider: "gcp", pat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/cloud-security.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (build/tools/deception.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/deception.js:109`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { name: "id_rsa", content: generateFakeSshKey(), }, { name: ".env
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/deception.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (build/tools/process-security.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/process-security.js:481`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ", "/etc/passwd", ".ssh/id_rsa", ".ssh/id_ed25519", "private.key"]; const checkProcs = processList.slice(0, 20); //
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/process-security.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (build/tools/secrets.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/secrets.js:103`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "-o", "-name", "id_rsa", "-o", "-name", "id_ecdsa",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/secrets.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/core/command-allowlist.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/core/command-allowlist.js:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/core/command-allowlist.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/core/executor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/core/executor.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync } from "node:fs"; import { homedir } from "node:os"; import
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/core/executor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/core/spawn-safe.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/core/spawn-safe.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cFileSync, } from "node:child_process"; import { resolveCommand } from "./command-allowlist.js"; // ── Argument Redactio
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/core/spawn-safe.js
Tools 31
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
access_controlno sensitive capabilityapi_securityno sensitive capabilityapp_hardenno sensitive capabilitybackupno sensitive capabilitycloud_securityno sensitive capabilitycomplianceno sensitive capabilitycontainer_dockerno sensitive capabilitycontainer_isolationno sensitive capabilitycryptono sensitive capabilitydefense_mgmtno sensitive capability
Show 21 more tools ↓
dns_securityno sensitive capabilityebpfno sensitive capabilityfirewallno sensitive capabilityharden_hostno sensitive capabilityharden_kernelno sensitive capabilityhoneypot_manageno sensitive capabilityincident_responseno sensitive capabilityintegrityno sensitive capabilitylog_managementno sensitive capabilitymalwareno sensitive capabilitynetwork_defenseno sensitive capabilitypatchno sensitive capabilityprocess_securityno sensitive capabilitysecretsno sensitive capabilitysudo_sessionno sensitive capabilitysupply_chainno sensitive capabilitythreat_intelno sensitive capabilityvuln_manageno sensitive capabilitywaf_manageno sensitive capabilitywireless_securityno sensitive capabilityzero_trustno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.9.5 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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