Mesh (decocms) MCP Server
@decocms/mesh
npm
v2.156.0
Source verified
Published by decocms — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP Mesh - Self-hostable MCP Gateway for managing AI connections and tools
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/client/assets/index-C8rduhby.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/client/assets/index-C8rduhby.js:148`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: dowith3?|drop|dropwhile|eval(?:cmd)?|exactp|filter|fix|fixity|flip|float(?:_matrix|_pointer)|floor|fold[lr]1?|frac|free|
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/client/assets/index-C8rduhby.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/client/assets/index-l0Z9QQ6e.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/client/assets/index-l0Z9QQ6e.js:167`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e.process(Y,w));const U=new Function(`${n.default.self}`,`${n.default.scope}`,Y)(this,this.scope.get());if(this.scope.va
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/client/assets/index-l0Z9QQ6e.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/client/assets/index-C8rduhby.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/client/assets/index-C8rduhby.js:148`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ntryTitle|eval(?:uate)?|exec(?:ute)?|exit|file(?:name)?|fill(?:attrs)?|flist|fnc|function(?:list)?|global|goto|group(?:b
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/client/assets/index-C8rduhby.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/client/assets/typescript-Ca_eWjgL.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/client/assets/typescript-Ca_eWjgL.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "async_hooks","buffer","child_process","cluster","console","constants","crypto","dgram","diagnostics_channel","dns","dns
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/client/assets/typescript-Ca_eWjgL.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/client/assets/readme-viewer-BjK7Zl_V.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/client/assets/readme-viewer-BjK7Zl_V.js:1`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (s,e){try{const r=await fetch(`https://api.github.com/repos/${s}/${e}/readme`,{headers:{Accept:"application/vnd.github.v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/client/assets/readme-viewer-BjK7Zl_V.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.156.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @decocms/mesh --onlineOther implementations of Mesh 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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