Db (neverinfamous) MCP Server
db-mcp
npm
v5.0.1
Source verified
Published by neverinfamous — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
SQLite MCP Server — Secure Database Administration & Observability with Code Mode. True V8 Isolate Sandbox Unifying 170+ Specialized Tools with Highly Optimized Payloads for 70–90% Token Savings. Includes Dynamic Tool Filtering, Dual-Transport HTTP/SSE, O
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/chunk-UE7GVOBV.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-UE7GVOBV.js:18011`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: text(sandboxEnv); vm.runInContext( ` const proxyHandler = { get(target, prop, receiver)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-UE7GVOBV.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/chunk-XLIYO3YA.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-XLIYO3YA.js:946`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s: require(), process., eval(), Function(), import(). Use sqlite.* API instead.", category: ErrorCategory.VALIDATION
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-XLIYO3YA.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-UE7GVOBV.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-UE7GVOBV.js:17638`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: oxy construction /\bchild_process/, // No child processes /\bfs\./, // No filesystem /\bnet\./,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-UE7GVOBV.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (install)MTC-SUP-010
"db-mcp" executes install script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: echo "Skipping automatic native build to preserve optional dependencies"
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package db-mcp
Tools 10
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
list_adaptersno sensitive capabilityserver_healthno sensitive capabilityserver_infono sensitive capabilitysqlite_audit_cleanupno sensitive capabilitysqlite_audit_diff_backupno sensitive capabilitysqlite_audit_get_backupno sensitive capabilitysqlite_audit_list_backupsno sensitive capabilitysqlite_audit_restore_backupno sensitive capabilitysqlite_audit_searchno sensitive capabilitysqlite_server_configno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (10 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v5.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan db-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Db 6
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 7 side by side →
MCP server exposing Postgres, Redis, Elasticsearch, MySQL, MongoDB, and LDAP as tools, with lazy connection management, retry, circuit breaking, per-connection read-only mode, and optional database drivers.
Database MCP server for MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, and SQLite with SSH tunneling support
MCP server for LobsterDB — managed PostgreSQL for agents
Universal MCP server for connecting Claude to SQL databases
MCP server for MySQL, PostgreSQL, SQLite, SQL Server, and Oracle
MCP Database Server with read-only access
More in Databases
Security scan results for the A5sql MCP server.
Expose AgentsKit tools as an MCP server — use them from Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, or any MCP host.
MCP server for Aiven cloud data platform - manage PostgreSQL, Kafka, and other services
MCP Server for All-Inkl.com hosting via KAS API
Structured aquarium, marine, terrarium and paludarium data for AI agents.
MCP server that gives your AI agent real vehicle data — specs, representative images, federal recalls, owner complaints, service bulletins, defect investigations, and OBD-II DTC reference — from the CarVector API.