Dax Query MCP Server
dax-query-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.8
Published by wes-stone — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dax_query_mcp/copilot_guard.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dax_query_mcp/copilot_guard.py:153`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ry: completed = subprocess.run( command, cwd=repo_root, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dax_query_mcp/copilot_guard.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (dax_query_mcp/executor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dax_query_mcp/executor.py:236`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: table() completed = subprocess.run( [ az_executable, "account", "get-acc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dax_query_mcp/executor.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (dax_query_mcp/mcp_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dax_query_mcp/mcp_server.py:224`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD"], cwd=repo_root,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dax_query_mcp/mcp_server.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (dax_query_mcp/scaffold.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dax_query_mcp/scaffold.py:187`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e() completed = subprocess.run( [ az_executable, "account",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dax_query_mcp/scaffold.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_mcp_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_mcp_server.py:2146`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: : str(script_path)} exec(script_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"), namespace) monkeypatch.setattr("sys.argv", ["
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_mcp_server.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_scaffold.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_scaffold.py:218`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t(encoding="utf-8") exec(script, namespace) with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="dataset-only executeQueries
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_scaffold.py
Tools 50
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
export_to_csvnetwork egresscheck_ai_readinessno sensitive capabilitycheck_context_stalenessno sensitive capabilityclear_workstationno sensitive capabilitycopy_to_clipboardno sensitive capabilitycreate_query_packno sensitive capabilitydescribe_query_packno sensitive capabilitydiff_data_dictionaryno sensitive capabilityexport_query_packno sensitive capabilityexport_workstationno sensitive capability
Show 40 more tools ↓
generate_data_dictionaryno sensitive capabilityget_connection_contextno sensitive capabilityget_context_bundleno sensitive capabilityget_data_dictionaryno sensitive capabilityget_filter_suggestionsno sensitive capabilityget_measure_detailno sensitive capabilityget_query_builderno sensitive capabilityget_query_builder_schemano sensitive capabilityget_relationshipsno sensitive capabilityget_schemano sensitive capabilityget_table_detailno sensitive capabilityinspect_connectionno sensitive capabilityinspect_model_metadatano sensitive capabilitylist_connectionsno sensitive capabilitylist_queriesno sensitive capabilitylist_query_packno sensitive capabilitylist_validated_queriesno sensitive capabilitylist_workstationno sensitive capabilitymerge_data_dictionaryno sensitive capabilityprobe_tmschema_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilityquick_chartno sensitive capabilityremove_from_workstationno sensitive capabilityreview_data_dictionary_updateno sensitive capabilityrun_ad_hoc_queryno sensitive capabilityrun_connection_queryno sensitive capabilityrun_named_queryno sensitive capabilitysave_query_builderno sensitive capabilitysave_query_to_packno sensitive capabilitysave_to_workstationno sensitive capabilitysave_validated_queryno sensitive capabilityscaffold_dax_workspaceno sensitive capabilityscaffold_power_queryno sensitive capabilityscaffold_streamlit_appno sensitive capabilitysearch_columnsno sensitive capabilitysearch_connection_contextno sensitive capabilitysearch_measuresno sensitive capabilitysearch_validated_queriesno sensitive capabilityserver_infono sensitive capabilityvalidate_query_libraryno sensitive capabilityvalidate_query_packno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (50 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.8 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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