Damai MCP Server
damai-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.2
Published by your-org — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/damai_mcp/damai/checklist.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/damai_mcp/damai/checklist.py:204`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: DeviceManager.shared().require(device_id) logger.info(f"[checklist] device ok: {info.model} {info.screen_size}"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/damai_mcp/damai/checklist.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/damai_mcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/damai_mcp/server.py:152`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: DeviceManager.shared().require(device_id) return info.to_dict() # ===============================================
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/damai_mcp/server.py
Tools 30
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
dump_uireads sensitive dataapp_grabno sensitive capabilityassert_textno sensitive capabilityconnect_deviceno sensitive capabilitydamai_check_loginno sensitive capabilitydamai_checklist_grabno sensitive capabilitydamai_confirm_orderno sensitive capabilitydamai_grabno sensitive capabilitydamai_grab_multino sensitive capabilitydamai_open_concertno sensitive capability
Show 20 more tools ↓
damai_payno sensitive capabilitydamai_select_priceno sensitive capabilitydamai_select_viewersno sensitive capabilitydevice_infono sensitive capabilitydisconnect_deviceno sensitive capabilitydouble_tapno sensitive capabilityfind_resource_idno sensitive capabilityfind_textno sensitive capabilityfind_xpathno sensitive capabilityinput_textno sensitive capabilitylist_app_profilesno sensitive capabilitylist_devicesno sensitive capabilitylong_pressno sensitive capabilityntp_syncno sensitive capabilitypress_keyno sensitive capabilityscrollno sensitive capabilityswipeno sensitive capabilitytake_screenshotno sensitive capabilitytapno sensitive capabilitywait_for_elementno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.2 latest |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan damai-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Other
Security scan results for the Adapter MCP server.
Security scan results for the Adguard Home MCP server.
Identity oracle and trust layer for autonomous AI agents. Bidirectional KYA and trust scoring.
Security scan results for the Ai MCP server.
Security scan results for the Airtable MCP server.
A free one-minute reset for people, delivered by AI, with no account or personal data.