Daileyos — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@daileyos/mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@daileyos/mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@daileyos/mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 88,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec",
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (102 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: dailey_build_logs → dailey_wordpress_migrate → dailey_db_exec. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "dailey_build_logs → dailey_wordpress_migrate → dailey_db_exec"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"dailey_build_logs",
"dailey_run_logs",
"dailey_process_logs",
"dailey_storage_info",
"dailey_storage_presign_download"
],
"sources": [
"dailey_wordpress_migrate"
],
"sinks": [
"dailey_db_exec",
"dailey_exec"
],
"path": [
"dailey_build_logs",
"dailey_wordpress_migrate",
"dailey_db_exec"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "dailey_build_logs",
"to": "dailey_wordpress_migrate",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "dailey_wordpress_migrate",
"to": "dailey_db_exec",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"dailey_db_exec\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"dailey_db_exec\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"exec\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "dailey_db_exec"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"dailey_exec\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"dailey_exec\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"exec\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "dailey_exec"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/version.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/version.js:45`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/version.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch('https://registry.npmjs.org/@daileyos%2Fmcp-server/latest', { signal: ctrl.sig",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/version.js",
"line": 45,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/version.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/version.ts:46`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/version.ts"
},
"evidence": "; const res = await fetch('https://registry.npmjs.org/@daileyos%2Fmcp-server/latest', { signal: ctrl.signal,",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/version.ts",
"line": 46,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"dailey_db_exec\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"dailey_db_exec\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "dailey_db_exec"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"dailey_exec\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"dailey_exec\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "dailey_exec"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/dailey-images.test.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/dailey-images.test.mjs:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/dailey-images.test.mjs"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { join, dirname } from 'node:path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:u",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/dailey-images.test.mjs",
"line": 17,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/environments.test.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/environments.test.mjs:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/environments.test.mjs"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { join, dirname } from 'node:path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:u",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/environments.test.mjs",
"line": 18,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/mcp-protocol-smoke.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/mcp-protocol-smoke.mjs:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/mcp-protocol-smoke.mjs"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import path from 'node:path'; const binary = path.resolve(new URL('.', import.m",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/mcp-protocol-smoke.mjs",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/pack1-mcp-preflight.test.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/pack1-mcp-preflight.test.mjs:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/pack1-mcp-preflight.test.mjs"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { join, dirname } from 'node:path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:u",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/pack1-mcp-preflight.test.mjs",
"line": 25,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/pack6-smoke.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/pack6-smoke.mjs:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/pack6-smoke.mjs"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import path from 'node:path'; const here = path.resolve(new URL('.', import.met",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/pack6-smoke.mjs",
"line": 14,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/wp-snapshot.test.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/wp-snapshot.test.mjs:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/wp-snapshot.test.mjs"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { join, dirname } from 'node:path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:u",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/wp-snapshot.test.mjs",
"line": 19,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"@daileyos/mcp-server\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@daileyos/mcp-server"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"@daileyos/mcp-server\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@daileyos/mcp-server"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"dailey_build_logs",
"dailey_run_logs",
"dailey_process_logs",
"dailey_storage_info",
"dailey_storage_presign_download"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"dailey_wordpress_migrate"
],
"externalSink": [
"dailey_db_exec",
"dailey_exec"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"dailey_build_logs",
"dailey_wordpress_migrate",
"dailey_db_exec"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: dailey_build_logs → dailey_wordpress_migrate → dailey_db_exec."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "dailey_accounts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_use_account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_addons",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_addon_purchase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_addon_cancel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_admin_onboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_ai_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_ai_enable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_compute_enable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_analyze_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_whoami",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_auth_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_auth_enable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_backups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_billing",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_billing_estimate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_build_logs",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_deploy_bundle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_cli_suggest_import",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_reveal_credential",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_credits",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_credits_topup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_images_generate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_images_enable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_images_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_db_migrate_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_db_migrate_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_db_migrate_confirm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_db_migrate_cancel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_db_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_db_schema",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_db_recall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_db_validate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_db_tunnel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_db_migrations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_db_import",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_db_exec",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"exec\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_deploy_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_app_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_deploy_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_rollback",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_deploy_rate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_diagnose",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_domains",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_email_enable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_email_disable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_email_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_env_vars",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_env_runtime_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_environments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_wp_clone",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_exec",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"exec\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_run_logs",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_run_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_inspect_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_marketplace_catalog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_project_credentials",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_project_resources",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_pause",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_resume",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_service_links",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_platform_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_os_guide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_processes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_process_logs",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_process_restart",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_process_metrics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_process_resources",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_project_transfer_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dailey_project_transfer_apply",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
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