Cyanheads Ts Core MCP Server
@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core
npm
v0.12.6
Published by @cyanheads — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Agent-native TypeScript framework for building MCP servers. Declarative definitions with auth, multi-backend storage, OpenTelemetry, and first-class support for Bun/Node/Cloudflare Workers.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 1 = 99. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/services/mirror/sqlite/handle.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/mirror/sqlite/handle.js:57`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const mod = (await import(BUN_SQLITE_SPECIFIER)); const db = new mod.Database(path, { create: true }); retu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/mirror/sqlite/handle.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/utils/parsing/xmlParser.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/parsing/xmlParser.js:22`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: _fxp; _fxp = await import(FXP_MODULE).catch(() => { throw configurationError('Install "fast-xml-parser" to
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/parsing/xmlParser.js
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/devcheck.ts)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/devcheck.ts:407`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: '*.env*', '**/.npmrc', '**/.netrc', '**/credentials.json', '**/*.pem', '**/*.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/devcheck.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/build.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/build.ts:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import { readdir, stat } from 'node:fs/p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/build.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check-framework-antipatterns.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check-framework-antipatterns.ts:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'; import process from 'node:process'; // Al
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/check-framework-antipatterns.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check-skill-versions.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check-skill-versions.ts:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import { resolve } from 'nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/check-skill-versions.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/clean-mcpb.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/clean-mcpb.ts:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, statSync } from 'node:fs'; import { resolve } from 'node:pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/clean-mcpb.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/devcheck.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/devcheck.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import * as path from 'node:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/devcheck.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/lint-packaging.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/lint-packaging.ts:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import { join,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/lint-packaging.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/release-github.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/release-github.ts:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import { resolve } from 'nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/release-github.ts
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/lint-mcp.ts)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/lint-mcp.ts:132`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const mod = await import(file); for (const exported of Object.values(mod)) { if (isToolLike(exported
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/lint-mcp.ts
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 9
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.12.6 latest |
A 99/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.12.5 |
A 99/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v0.12.3 |
A 99/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.12.2 |
A 99/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
v0.11.5 |
A 99/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
Show 4 more versions ↓
v0.11.4 |
A 99/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v0.11.1 |
A 99/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v0.11.0 |
A 99/100 | 11 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-02 |
v0.10.15 |
A 99/100 | 11 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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