Cutmaster Ai MCP Server
cutmaster-ai
PyPI
v0.6.0
Published by celaviihq — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Maximum-control MCP server for DaVinci Resolve Studio — 241 tools, AI-enhanced workflows, skills, and agents.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/cutmaster_ai/tools/scripting.py)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`src/cutmaster_ai/tools/scripting.py:49`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: value) result = eval(code, {"__builtins__": __builtins__}, scope) return str(result) if result is not No
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cutmaster_ai/tools/scripting.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/cutmaster_ai/tools/scripting.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/cutmaster_ai/tools/scripting.py:49`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: value) result = eval(code, {"__builtins__": __builtins__}, scope) return str(result) if result is not No
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cutmaster_ai/tools/scripting.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cutmaster_ai/cutmaster/analysis/audio_cues.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cutmaster_ai/cutmaster/analysis/audio_cues.py:164`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "-", ] r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False) if r.returncode != 0:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cutmaster_ai/cutmaster/analysis/audio_cues.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cutmaster_ai/cutmaster/media/ffmpeg_audio.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cutmaster_ai/cutmaster/media/ffmpeg_audio.py:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: etedProcess: return subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False) def extract_timeline_audio(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cutmaster_ai/cutmaster/media/ffmpeg_audio.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cutmaster_ai/cutmaster/media/ffmpeg_frames.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cutmaster_ai/cutmaster/media/ffmpeg_frames.py:134`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "-", ] r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, check=False) if r.returncode != 0 or not r.stdout:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cutmaster_ai/cutmaster/media/ffmpeg_frames.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cutmaster_ai/cutmaster/media/vfr.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cutmaster_ai/cutmaster/media/vfr.py:50`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ror(str(path)) r = subprocess.run( [ "ffprobe", "-v", "error",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cutmaster_ai/cutmaster/media/vfr.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cutmaster_ai/cutmaster/stt/per_clip.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cutmaster_ai/cutmaster/stt/per_clip.py:223`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ation_s r = subprocess.run( [ "ffmpeg", "-y",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cutmaster_ai/cutmaster/stt/per_clip.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cutmaster_ai/resolve.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cutmaster_ai/resolve.py:199`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = "darwin": subprocess.Popen(["open", app]) else: subprocess.Popen([app]) except Exc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cutmaster_ai/resolve.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cutmaster_ai/tools/scripting.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cutmaster_ai/tools/scripting.py:63`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: last.value) exec(compile(stmts, "<string>", "exec"), {"__builtins__": __builtins__}, scope) resu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cutmaster_ai/tools/scripting.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/install.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/install.py:94`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( [ path, "-c"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/install.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/cutmaster/test_panel_axes_parity.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/cutmaster/test_panel_axes_parity.py:40`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: out = subprocess.run( ["node", "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/cutmaster/test_panel_axes_parity.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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