Customazuremcpagent MCP Server
customazuremcpagent
PyPI
v4.1
Published by jhasiddhant — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (agent/azure.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`agent/azure.py:1072`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( ["az", "monitor", "log-analytics", "workspace", "list",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server agent/azure.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (agent/utils.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`agent/utils.py:467`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( command, shell=False, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server agent/utils.py
Tools 44
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ado_assign_roleno sensitive capabilityado_create_branchno sensitive capabilityado_create_pipelineno sensitive capabilityado_create_projectno sensitive capabilityado_create_repono sensitive capabilityado_deploy_custom_yamlno sensitive capabilityado_deploy_pipeline_yamlno sensitive capabilityado_list_projectsno sensitive capabilityado_list_reposno sensitive capabilityazure_activate_pim_rolesno sensitive capability
Show 34 more tools ↓
azure_assign_pim_roleno sensitive capabilityazure_assign_rbac_roleno sensitive capabilityazure_attach_appinsightsno sensitive capabilityazure_attach_dce_to_dcrno sensitive capabilityazure_attach_diagnostic_settingsno sensitive capabilityazure_attach_to_nspno sensitive capabilityazure_check_resourceno sensitive capabilityazure_create_container_appno sensitive capabilityazure_create_container_apps_envno sensitive capabilityazure_create_data_collection_endpointno sensitive capabilityazure_create_data_collection_ruleno sensitive capabilityazure_create_private_endpointno sensitive capabilityazure_create_resourceno sensitive capabilityazure_create_resource_groupno sensitive capabilityazure_get_activity_logno sensitive capabilityazure_get_bicep_requirementsno sensitive capabilityazure_get_resource_infono sensitive capabilityazure_integrate_vnetno sensitive capabilityazure_list_rolesno sensitive capabilityazure_list_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilityazure_loginno sensitive capabilityazure_manage_pe_connectionno sensitive capabilityazure_set_subscriptionno sensitive capabilityazure_update_tagsno sensitive capabilityfabric_add_deployment_pipeline_roleno sensitive capabilityfabric_assign_roleno sensitive capabilityfabric_attach_workspace_to_gitno sensitive capabilityfabric_create_deployment_pipelineno sensitive capabilityfabric_create_managed_private_endpointno sensitive capabilityfabric_create_workspaceno sensitive capabilityfabric_list_managed_private_endpointsno sensitive capabilityfabric_list_permissionsno sensitive capabilityget_current_userno sensitive capabilityshow_agent_instructionsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v4.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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