Cucumberstudio MCP Server
cucumberstudio-mcp
npm
v1.2.2
Source verified
Published by herosizy — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Cucumber Studio API integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 0 = 100. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
✓ No adoption-risk deductions — minimal blast radius, verified enough, and fully inspected.
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/npx-wrapper.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/npx-wrapper.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process' import { join, dirname } from 'path' import { fileURLToPath } from 'url' // Get
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/npx-wrapper.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/postinstall.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/postinstall.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process' // Get current directory for ES modules const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/postinstall.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/prepublish.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/prepublish.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process' // Get current directory for ES modules const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/prepublish.js
Tools 15
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
cucumberstudio_configureno sensitive capabilitycucumberstudio_find_action_words_by_tagsno sensitive capabilitycucumberstudio_find_scenarios_by_tagsno sensitive capabilitycucumberstudio_get_action_wordno sensitive capabilitycucumberstudio_get_buildno sensitive capabilitycucumberstudio_get_projectno sensitive capabilitycucumberstudio_get_scenariono sensitive capabilitycucumberstudio_get_test_executionsno sensitive capabilitycucumberstudio_get_test_runno sensitive capabilitycucumberstudio_list_action_wordsno sensitive capability
Show 5 more tools ↓
cucumberstudio_list_buildsno sensitive capabilitycucumberstudio_list_execution_environmentsno sensitive capabilitycucumberstudio_list_projectsno sensitive capabilitycucumberstudio_list_scenariosno sensitive capabilitycucumberstudio_list_test_runsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (15 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.2 latest |
A 100/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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