Cli MCP Server
@ctxo/cli
npm
v0.11.4
Source verified
Published by alperhankendi — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli-router-T6OCTM43.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli-router-T6OCTM43.js:41`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s execFileSync2 } from "child_process"; import { readFileSync as readFileSync6, writeFileSync as writeFileSync2, existsS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli-router-T6OCTM43.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/cli-router-T6OCTM43.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli-router-T6OCTM43.js:147`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; const mod = await import(target); const candidate = mod.default ?? mod.plugin ?? mod; if (!candidate || ty
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli-router-T6OCTM43.js
Tools 14
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
find_dead_codeno sensitive capabilityfind_importersno sensitive capabilityget_architectural_overlayno sensitive capabilityget_blast_radiusno sensitive capabilityget_change_intelligenceno sensitive capabilityget_changed_symbolsno sensitive capabilityget_class_hierarchyno sensitive capabilityget_context_for_taskno sensitive capabilityget_logic_sliceno sensitive capabilityget_pr_impactno sensitive capability
Show 4 more tools ↓
get_ranked_contextno sensitive capabilityget_symbol_importanceno sensitive capabilityget_why_contextno sensitive capabilitysearch_symbolsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (14 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.11.4 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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