Remembry MCP Server
@cstan0824/remembry-mcp
npm
v0.3.3
Source verified
Published by kongjiyu — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Remembry MCP Server — manage your meeting knowledge base via AI assistants. Recording requires the Remembry desktop app to be running.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 6 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1114`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import("node:child_process"); if (platform === "win32") { exec(`start "" "${appPath}"`);
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1116`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "win32") { exec(`start "" "${appPath}"`); } else if (platform === "darwin") { e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
Tools 26
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
remembry_config_statusno sensitive capabilityremembry_create_documentno sensitive capabilityremembry_create_eventno sensitive capabilityremembry_create_projectno sensitive capabilityremembry_delete_documentno sensitive capabilityremembry_delete_eventno sensitive capabilityremembry_delete_projectno sensitive capabilityremembry_get_eventno sensitive capabilityremembry_get_event_knowledgeno sensitive capabilityremembry_get_jobsno sensitive capability
Show 16 more tools ↓
remembry_get_projectno sensitive capabilityremembry_list_documentsno sensitive capabilityremembry_list_eventsno sensitive capabilityremembry_list_projectsno sensitive capabilityremembry_open_appno sensitive capabilityremembry_recording_statusno sensitive capabilityremembry_searchno sensitive capabilityremembry_search_knowledgeno sensitive capabilityremembry_start_recordingno sensitive capabilityremembry_stop_recordingno sensitive capabilityremembry_update_eventno sensitive capabilityremembry_update_event_knowledgeno sensitive capabilityremembry_update_meeting_transcriptionno sensitive capabilityremembry_update_projectno sensitive capabilityremembry_upload_audiono sensitive capabilityremembry_upload_recordingno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.3 latest |
B 88/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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