Cryptoseed MCP Server
cryptoseed-mcp
npm
v1.3.0
Published by purplebass — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Cryptography tools for AI agents: ChaCha20-Poly1305, X25519, Ed25519. Keys in system Keychain. HTTP/HTTPS transport for remote agents. macOS, Linux, Windows.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 12.9 = 87. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −12.9 | Description names a credential store the tool cannot reach ×6 MTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 87 − 4 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
medium Description names a credential store the tool cannot reachMTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1
Tool "key_new" describes a credential store (SSH keys, cloud credentials, a keychain or an equivalent) that nothing in its input schema can address. A tool's interface is the honest statement of what it touches; prose that reaches past it is addressed to the model, not to a reader.
Evidence: Keychain
Fix: Remove the reference, or expose the target as an explicit, validated parameter so the client can see and consent to what the tool reads.
Location: tool key_new · description
medium Description names a credential store the tool cannot reachMTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1
Tool "key_list" describes a credential store (SSH keys, cloud credentials, a keychain or an equivalent) that nothing in its input schema can address. A tool's interface is the honest statement of what it touches; prose that reaches past it is addressed to the model, not to a reader.
Evidence: Keychain
Fix: Remove the reference, or expose the target as an explicit, validated parameter so the client can see and consent to what the tool reads.
Location: tool key_list · description
medium Description names a credential store the tool cannot reachMTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1
Tool "identity_new" describes a credential store (SSH keys, cloud credentials, a keychain or an equivalent) that nothing in its input schema can address. A tool's interface is the honest statement of what it touches; prose that reaches past it is addressed to the model, not to a reader.
Evidence: Keychain
Fix: Remove the reference, or expose the target as an explicit, validated parameter so the client can see and consent to what the tool reads.
Location: tool identity_new · description
medium Description names a credential store the tool cannot reachMTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1
Tool "identity_list" describes a credential store (SSH keys, cloud credentials, a keychain or an equivalent) that nothing in its input schema can address. A tool's interface is the honest statement of what it touches; prose that reaches past it is addressed to the model, not to a reader.
Evidence: Keychain
Fix: Remove the reference, or expose the target as an explicit, validated parameter so the client can see and consent to what the tool reads.
Location: tool identity_list · description
medium Description names a credential store the tool cannot reachMTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1
Tool "signing_key_new" describes a credential store (SSH keys, cloud credentials, a keychain or an equivalent) that nothing in its input schema can address. A tool's interface is the honest statement of what it touches; prose that reaches past it is addressed to the model, not to a reader.
Evidence: Keychain
Fix: Remove the reference, or expose the target as an explicit, validated parameter so the client can see and consent to what the tool reads.
Location: tool signing_key_new · description
medium Description names a credential store the tool cannot reachMTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1
Tool "signing_key_list" describes a credential store (SSH keys, cloud credentials, a keychain or an equivalent) that nothing in its input schema can address. A tool's interface is the honest statement of what it touches; prose that reaches past it is addressed to the model, not to a reader.
Evidence: Keychain
Fix: Remove the reference, or expose the target as an explicit, validated parameter so the client can see and consent to what the tool reads.
Location: tool signing_key_list · description
Tools 27
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
decrypt_asymingests untrusted inputcontact_addno sensitive capabilitycontact_exportno sensitive capabilitycontact_importno sensitive capabilitycontact_infono sensitive capabilitycontact_key_addno sensitive capabilitycontact_listno sensitive capabilitycontact_pubkeyno sensitive capabilitycontact_removeno sensitive capabilitycontact_updateno sensitive capability
Show 17 more tools ↓
decrypt_fileno sensitive capabilitydecrypt_textno sensitive capabilityencrypt_asymno sensitive capabilityencrypt_fileno sensitive capabilityencrypt_textno sensitive capabilityidentity_listno sensitive capabilityidentity_newno sensitive capabilityidentity_pubkeyno sensitive capabilitykey_listno sensitive capabilitykey_newno sensitive capabilitysign_fileno sensitive capabilitysign_textno sensitive capabilitysigning_key_listno sensitive capabilitysigning_key_newno sensitive capabilitysigning_key_pubkeyno sensitive capabilityverify_fileno sensitive capabilityverify_textno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.0 latest |
B 83/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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