Raw scan report

Crypto Quant Signal — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.5.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "crypto-quant-signal-mcp",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "crypto-quant-signal-mcp"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "crypto-quant-signal-mcp"
    }
  },
  "grade": "B",
  "score": {
    "score": 83,
    "grade": "B",
    "band": "B",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 6.3,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 11.03,
      "supply-chain": 0,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
        "category": "permissions",
        "severity": "medium",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 9,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 6.3
      },
      {
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
        "category": "permissions",
        "severity": "medium",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 9,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 0.5,
        "appliedPenalty": 3.15
      },
      {
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
        "category": "permissions",
        "severity": "medium",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 9,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 0.25,
        "appliedPenalty": 1.58
      },
      {
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "category": "injection",
        "severity": "medium",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 9,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 6.3
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "can send data / act on an external service",
      "reads sensitive or local data",
      "has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
      "can execute shell commands or code"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "sensitive-source",
      "code-exec",
      "external-sink"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": false,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
      "title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/scripts/seed-shadow-venues-w3a.js)",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/scripts/seed-shadow-venues-w3a.js:19`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/scripts/seed-shadow-venues-w3a.js"
      },
      "evidence": "~/.ssh",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
        "file": "dist/scripts/seed-shadow-venues-w3a.js",
        "line": 19
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
      "title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/scripts/acp-graduation-buyer.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/scripts/acp-graduation-buyer.js:267`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/scripts/acp-graduation-buyer.js"
      },
      "evidence": "eval (",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
        "file": "dist/scripts/acp-graduation-buyer.js",
        "line": 267
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/changelog-parser.d.ts)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/changelog-parser.d.ts:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/lib/changelog-parser.d.ts"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/lib/changelog-parser.d.ts",
        "line": 5
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/changelog-parser.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/changelog-parser.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/lib/changelog-parser.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/lib/changelog-parser.js",
        "line": 6
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/funnel-snapshot.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/funnel-snapshot.js:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/lib/funnel-snapshot.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/lib/funnel-snapshot.js",
        "line": 35
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/performance-db.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/performance-db.js:109`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/lib/performance-db.js"
      },
      "evidence": "exec(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/lib/performance-db.js",
        "line": 109
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/scripts/monitor.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/scripts/monitor.js:614`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/scripts/monitor.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/scripts/monitor.js",
        "line": 614
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/scripts/nightly-carry-labeler.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/scripts/nightly-carry-labeler.js:57`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/scripts/nightly-carry-labeler.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/scripts/nightly-carry-labeler.js",
        "line": 57
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
      "title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/lib/auth-providers.js)",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/auth-providers.js:83`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/lib/auth-providers.js"
      },
      "evidence": "fetch('https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token'",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
        "file": "dist/lib/auth-providers.js",
        "line": 83
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
      "title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/scripts/agent-forum-post.js)",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/scripts/agent-forum-post.js:600`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/scripts/agent-forum-post.js"
      },
      "evidence": "fetch('https://www.moltbook.com/api/v1/posts'",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
        "file": "dist/scripts/agent-forum-post.js",
        "line": 600
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
      "title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/scripts/register-erc8004-agent.js)",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/scripts/register-erc8004-agent.js:90`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/scripts/register-erc8004-agent.js"
      },
      "evidence": "fetch('https://api.pinata.cloud/pinning/pinJSONToIPFS'",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
        "file": "dist/scripts/register-erc8004-agent.js",
        "line": 90
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
      "title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/lib/performance-db.js)",
      "category": "injection",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/performance-db.js:372`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/lib/performance-db.js"
      },
      "evidence": "exec(`ALTER TABLE ${m.table} ADD COLUMN ${m.column} ${",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "file": "dist/lib/performance-db.js",
        "line": 372
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
      "title": "Unsafe deserialization (dist/lib/geo-decide.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/geo-decide.js:73`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/lib/geo-decide.js"
      },
      "evidence": "yaml.load(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
        "file": "dist/lib/geo-decide.js",
        "line": 73
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
      "title": "Unsafe deserialization (dist/lib/geo-orchestrator.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/geo-orchestrator.js:128`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/lib/geo-orchestrator.js"
      },
      "evidence": "yaml.load(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
        "file": "dist/lib/geo-orchestrator.js",
        "line": 128
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
      "title": "Unsafe deserialization (dist/scripts/geo-demand-mining.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/scripts/geo-demand-mining.js:82`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/scripts/geo-demand-mining.js"
      },
      "evidence": "yaml.load(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
        "file": "dist/scripts/geo-demand-mining.js",
        "line": 82
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [],
  "surfaceDigest": "c5837da4949856ce8788e8af677076ea000729ebf0042ff32763ecf7fcb0570f",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 0,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 8,
      "medium": 7,
      "low": 0,
      "info": 0
    }
  }
}