Crowdsec Local MCP Server
crowdsec-local-mcp
PyPI
v0.9.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/crowdsec_local_mcp/mcp_core.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/crowdsec_local_mcp/mcp_core.py:125`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) try: subprocess.run( ["docker", "info"], #noqa: S607 check=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/crowdsec_local_mcp/mcp_core.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/crowdsec_local_mcp/mcp_scenarios.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/crowdsec_local_mcp/mcp_scenarios.py:334`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: return subprocess.run( full_cmd, cwd=str(SCENARIO_COMPOSE_DIR), cap
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/crowdsec_local_mcp/mcp_scenarios.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/crowdsec_local_mcp/mcp_waf.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/crowdsec_local_mcp/mcp_waf.py:70`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: services) result = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=str(WAF_TEST_COMPOSE_DIR), capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/crowdsec_local_mcp/mcp_waf.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/crowdsec_local_mcp/setup_cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/crowdsec_local_mcp/setup_cli.py:181`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) result = subprocess.run(claude_invocation, check=False) if result.returncode != 0: raise Runt
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/crowdsec_local_mcp/setup_cli.py
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([fetch_nuclei_exploit]) co-exist with external-action tools ([curl_waf_endpoint]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [fetch_nuclei_exploit] → sinks [curl_waf_endpoint]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow fetch_nuclei_exploit → curl_waf_endpoint
Tools 24
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
curl_waf_endpointnetwork egressfetch_nuclei_exploitingests untrusted inputdeploy_scenariono sensitive capabilitydeploy_waf_ruleno sensitive capabilityexplain_scenariono sensitive capabilitygenerate_waf_ruleno sensitive capabilitygenerate_waf_testsno sensitive capabilityget_scenario_examplesno sensitive capabilityget_scenario_expr_helpersno sensitive capabilityget_scenario_promptno sensitive capability
Show 14 more tools ↓
get_waf_examplesno sensitive capabilityget_waf_pr_promptno sensitive capabilityget_waf_promptno sensitive capabilityget_waf_rule_challenge_promptno sensitive capabilityget_waf_top_level_promptno sensitive capabilitylint_scenario_yamlno sensitive capabilitylint_waf_ruleno sensitive capabilitymanage_scenario_stackno sensitive capabilitymanage_waf_stackno sensitive capabilityprepare_waf_prno sensitive capabilityrun_waf_testsno sensitive capabilitytest_scenariono sensitive capabilityvalidate_scenario_yamlno sensitive capabilityvalidate_waf_ruleno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (24 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.9.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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