Crossref Local MCP Server
crossref-local
PyPI
v0.8.1
Published by ywatanabe1989 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/crossref_local/_sphinx_html/_static/doctools.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/crossref_local/_sphinx_html/_static/doctools.js:60`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: mentation.PLURAL_EXPR = new Function( "n", `return (${catalog.plural_expr})`, ); Documentation.LOCAL
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/crossref_local/_sphinx_html/_static/doctools.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/crossref_local/_cli/utils.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/crossref_local/_cli/utils.py:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e port result = subprocess.run( ["lsof", "-ti", f":{port}"], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/crossref_local/_cli/utils.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/database/99_check_db_connections.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/database/99_check_db_connections.py:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["lsof", db_path], capture_output=True, text
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/database/99_check_db_connections.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/examples/test_01_quickstart.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/examples/test_01_quickstart.py:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: # Act completed = subprocess.run(cmd, check=False, capture_output=True) # Assert assert completed.returnco
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/examples/test_01_quickstart.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/examples/test_05_abstract_coverage.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/examples/test_05_abstract_coverage.py:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: # Act completed = subprocess.run(cmd, check=False, capture_output=True) # Assert assert completed.returnco
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/examples/test_05_abstract_coverage.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/examples/test_compose_readme.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/examples/test_compose_readme.py:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: # Act completed = subprocess.run(cmd, check=False, capture_output=True) # Assert assert completed.returnco
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/examples/test_compose_readme.py
Tools 17
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
crossref_local_skills_getingests untrusted inputcache_citation_summaryno sensitive capabilitycache_createno sensitive capabilitycache_exportno sensitive capabilitycache_listno sensitive capabilitycache_plot_networkno sensitive capabilitycache_plot_scatterno sensitive capabilitycache_queryno sensitive capabilitycache_statsno sensitive capabilitycache_top_citedno sensitive capability
Show 7 more tools ↓
check_bibtexno sensitive capabilitycheck_citationsno sensitive capabilitycrossref_local_skills_listno sensitive capabilityenrich_doisno sensitive capabilityget_statusno sensitive capabilitysearch_by_doino sensitive capabilitysearch_worksno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.8.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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