Crew — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "crew-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "crew-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "crew-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/add-GITBMLEX.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/add-GITBMLEX.js:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/add-GITBMLEX.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from \"child_process\"; // src/install/provider-detection.ts var OLLAMA_DEFAULT_URL = \"http://localhost",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/add-GITBMLEX.js",
"line": 27,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-3AHGB7CY.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-3AHGB7CY.js:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chunk-3AHGB7CY.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from \"child_process\"; import { createHash, randomUUID } from \"crypto\"; import { createReadStream,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/chunk-3AHGB7CY.js",
"line": 30,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-FZBQAZ4P.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-FZBQAZ4P.js:697`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chunk-FZBQAZ4P.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from \"child_process\"; function osNotificationsEnabled(status) { if (process.env.CREW_OS_NOTIFICATION",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/chunk-FZBQAZ4P.js",
"line": 697,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-MPXQ7WUK.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-MPXQ7WUK.js:2705`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chunk-MPXQ7WUK.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFileSync } from \"child_process\"; import { existsSync as existsSync5, readFileSync as readFileSync5, statSync as s",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/chunk-MPXQ7WUK.js",
"line": 2705,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-T75NVFMK.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-T75NVFMK.js:86`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/chunk-T75NVFMK.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"util\"; var execFileAsync = promisify(execFile); async",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/chunk-T75NVFMK.js",
"line": 86,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/codex-2PA3C2TO.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/codex-2PA3C2TO.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/codex-2PA3C2TO.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from \"child_process\"; import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, rmdirSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from \"fs\";",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/codex-2PA3C2TO.js",
"line": 16,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "import { spawn } from \"child_process\"; import { existsSync } from \"fs\"; import { createInterface } from \"readline\"; imp",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 37,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "send_message",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_crew_preferences",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_runs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_captain_inbox",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "acknowledge_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_panel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_panel_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "aggregate_panel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_criteria",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "confirm_criteria",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_criteria",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "revise_criteria",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "continue_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "merge_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discard_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_run_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cancel_run",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "3989c0729890411d5023ca431915761ad2e77d9445cac37f7b3bd831592ce5a8",
"stats": {
"tools": 19,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 7,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}