Creative Tagger MCP Server
creative-tagger-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.4
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for Creative Tagger — taxonomy + library memory + strategist tools for any AI agent
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 2 = 98. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_tool_surface.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_tool_surface.py:1498`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: indent=2))], } exec(compile(module, str(SERVER), "exec"), namespace) return namespace if __name__ == "__m
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_tool_surface.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/smoke_release.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/smoke_release.py:181`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rocess[str]: proc = subprocess.run( command, check=False, capture_output=True, text=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/smoke_release.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_tool_surface.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_tool_surface.py:1498`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: indent=2))], } exec(compile(module, str(SERVER), "exec"), namespace) return namespace if __name__ == "__m
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_tool_surface.py
Tools 44
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze_creativeno sensitive capabilityanalyze_gapsno sensitive capabilitycreate_custom_reportno sensitive capabilitydelete_brand_entityno sensitive capabilitydelete_brand_taxonomy_valueno sensitive capabilitydelete_custom_reportno sensitive capabilitydelete_naming_templateno sensitive capabilityexport_brain_learnings_contextno sensitive capabilityexport_demographics_contextno sensitive capabilityexport_performance_timeseries_contextno sensitive capability
Show 34 more tools ↓
generate_brand_taxonomyno sensitive capabilitygenerate_namingno sensitive capabilityget_analysisno sensitive capabilityget_brain_learningsno sensitive capabilityget_brand_contextno sensitive capabilityget_brand_taxonomyno sensitive capabilityget_competitor_scan_historyno sensitive capabilityget_creative_strategy_reportno sensitive capabilityget_demographics_performanceno sensitive capabilityget_library_patternsno sensitive capabilityget_meta_performance_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_meta_statusno sensitive capabilityget_naming_variablesno sensitive capabilityget_performance_timeseriesno sensitive capabilityget_prebuilt_reportsno sensitive capabilityget_taxonomyno sensitive capabilityget_taxonomy_performanceno sensitive capabilityimport_competitor_adsno sensitive capabilitylist_custom_reportsno sensitive capabilitylist_libraryno sensitive capabilitylist_naming_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_workspacesno sensitive capabilitypredict_creativeno sensitive capabilitypreview_naming_templateno sensitive capabilityrecommendno sensitive capabilityrun_saved_custom_reportno sensitive capabilitysave_brain_learningsno sensitive capabilitysave_custom_reportno sensitive capabilitysave_naming_templateno sensitive capabilityscan_competitorno sensitive capabilityset_brand_contextno sensitive capabilityset_brand_entityno sensitive capabilityset_brand_taxonomy_valueno sensitive capabilitysync_meta_performanceno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.4 latest |
A 98/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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