Creative Pipeline MCP Server
creative-pipeline-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Source verified
Published by taiyuhiga — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
QC-first MCP pipeline for Blender assets and Premiere media workflows.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Shell/command execution in server code (packages/blender-pro-mcp/dist/adapters/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`packages/blender-pro-mcp/dist/adapters/cli.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { join, resolve } from "node:path"; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/blender-pro-mcp/dist/adapters/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (packages/blender-pro-mcp/src/adapters/cli.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`packages/blender-pro-mcp/src/adapters/cli.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { join, resolve } from "node:path"; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/blender-pro-mcp/src/adapters/cli.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (packages/premiere-pro-mcp/dist/adapters/ffmpegQc.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`packages/premiere-pro-mcp/dist/adapters/ffmpegQc.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdir, readFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { dirname } from "nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/premiere-pro-mcp/dist/adapters/ffmpegQc.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (packages/premiere-pro-mcp/dist/adapters/ffprobe.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`packages/premiere-pro-mcp/dist/adapters/ffprobe.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/premiere-pro-mcp/dist/adapters/ffprobe.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (packages/premiere-pro-mcp/dist/adapters/optionalTools.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`packages/premiere-pro-mcp/dist/adapters/optionalTools.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { access, mkdir } from "node:fs/promises"; import { constants, existsSync
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/premiere-pro-mcp/dist/adapters/optionalTools.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (packages/premiere-pro-mcp/src/adapters/ffmpegQc.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`packages/premiere-pro-mcp/src/adapters/ffmpegQc.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdir, readFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { dirname } from "nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/premiere-pro-mcp/src/adapters/ffmpegQc.ts
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (packages/premiere-cep-panel/js/main.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`packages/premiere-cep-panel/js/main.js:4`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nction") { return require(moduleName); } if (window.cep_node && typeof window.cep_node.require === "functi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server packages/premiere-cep-panel/js/main.js
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/simulate-premiere-cep.mjs)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/simulate-premiere-cep.mjs:24`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: createContext(context); vm.runInContext(readFileSync(resolve(root, "packages/premiere-cep-panel/jsx/host.jsx"), "utf8"),
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/simulate-premiere-cep.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/blender-bridge-queue.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/blender-bridge-queue.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdirSync } from "node:fs"; import { resolve } from "node:path"; const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/blender-bridge-queue.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/blender-e2e.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/blender-e2e.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdirSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { resolve } from "nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/blender-e2e.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/premiere-project-delivery.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/premiere-project-delivery.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdirSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { join, resol
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/premiere-project-delivery.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/premiere-qc-e2e.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/premiere-qc-e2e.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { mkdirSync } from "node:fs"; import { resolve } from "node:path"; const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/premiere-qc-e2e.mjs
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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