Crawlemoon — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "crawlemoon",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "crawlemoon"
},
"server": {
"name": "crawlemoon"
}
},
"grade": "D",
"score": {
"score": 61,
"threatScore": 76,
"grade": "D",
"band": "D",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 15.4,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 6.3,
"supply-chain": 2.1,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-004",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 2.1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlocatable) — no provenance and no public repository to inspect",
"appliedPenalty": 5
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (60 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-004",
"title": "Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (tests/test_js_deobfuscator.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`tests/test_js_deobfuscator.py:34`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_js_deobfuscator.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(atob",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-004",
"file": "tests/test_js_deobfuscator.py",
"line": 34
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"execute_js\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"execute_js\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"script\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "execute_js"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/intelligence/js/deobfuscator.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/intelligence/js/deobfuscator.py:68`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/intelligence/js/deobfuscator.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/intelligence/js/deobfuscator.py",
"line": 68
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (tests/test_js_deobfuscator.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`tests/test_js_deobfuscator.py:34`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_js_deobfuscator.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "tests/test_js_deobfuscator.py",
"line": 34
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (tests/test_js_security.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`tests/test_js_security.py:33`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_js_security.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "tests/test_js_security.py",
"line": 33
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/core/browser/xray.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/core/browser/xray.py:96`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/core/browser/xray.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/core/browser/xray.py",
"line": 96
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp/server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/mcp/server.py:1325`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/mcp/server.py"
},
"evidence": "spawn (",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/mcp/server.py",
"line": 1325
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([check_robots, crawl]) co-exist with external-action tools ([stealth_request, execute_js]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "check_robots → stealth_request"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [check_robots, crawl] → sinks [stealth_request, execute_js]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"check_robots",
"crawl"
],
"sinks": [
"stealth_request",
"execute_js"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (tests/test_js_analyzer.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`tests/test_js_analyzer.py:23`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_js_analyzer.py"
},
"evidence": "fetch('https://api.example.com/users'",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "tests/test_js_analyzer.py",
"line": 23
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (tests/test_mcp_server.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`tests/test_mcp_server.py:115`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_mcp_server.py"
},
"evidence": "fetch('https://api.example.com'",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "tests/test_mcp_server.py",
"line": 115
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"check_robots\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"check_robots\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "check_robots",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "url"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"stealth_request\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"stealth_request\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "stealth_request",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "url"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"crawl\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"crawl\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "crawl",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "url"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"script\" on \"execute_js\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"execute_js\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"script\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "execute_js",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.script"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "script"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (src/core/cache/manager.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/core/cache/manager.py:74`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/core/cache/manager.py"
},
"evidence": "pickle.loads(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "src/core/cache/manager.py",
"line": 74
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"execute_js\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"execute_js\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "execute_js"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package has no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"crawlemoon\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "crawlemoon"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"check_robots",
"crawl"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"stealth_request",
"execute_js"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "deep_analyze",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discover_apis",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "introspect_graphql",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_websocket",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stop_recording",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_recordings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_recording_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_crawler",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_auth",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "detect_protection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deobfuscate_js",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_from_js",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "health_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "configure_proxies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "load_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_sessions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_sitemap",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_robots",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"crawl\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "take_screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_article",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "solve_captcha",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "detect_technology",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "smart_extract",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "convert_to_markdown",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stealth_request",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"http_request\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "clear_cache",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_cache_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "configure_rate_limit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_rate_limit_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_proxy_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_proxy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_proxy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_proxy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "execute_graphql",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "execute_js",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"script\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_cookies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_storage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_recording",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_recording",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_links",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_forms",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_metadata",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_tables",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "execute_cdp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_dom_tree",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "measure_performance",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_resources",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_accessibility",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compare_pages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "monitor_network",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fill_form",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "wait_and_extract",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "crawl",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"crawl\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "structured_extract",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "configure_xray_subscription",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_xray_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rotate_xray_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "test_xray_nodes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "4f6734ae1af6ea3e1998a7d608dcf870d6ad8f9f07d8ec4bef4bbc6a2766196f",
"stats": {
"tools": 60,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 7,
"medium": 8,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}