Crafty MCP Server
crafty-mcp
npm
v0.1.2
Published by hadicherkaoui — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Crafty Controller 4 — manage Minecraft servers via AI assistants
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([server_get_logs, server_list_files]) and tools that can send data out ([server_get_webhook, server_create_webhook, server_update_webhook, server_delete_webhook, server_test_webhook]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [server_get_logs, server_list_files] → sinks [server_get_webhook, server_create_webhook, server_update_webhook, server_delete_webhook, server_test_webho
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow server_get_logs → server_get_webhook
medium Tool "server_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "server_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool server_delete_file
medium Tool "server_create_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "server_create_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "create_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool server_create_file
low Mutating tool "server_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "server_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool server_delete_file
low Mutating tool "server_create_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "server_create_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool server_create_file
Tools 56
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
server_create_filewrites filesserver_create_webhooknetwork egressserver_delete_filewrites filesserver_delete_webhooknetwork egressserver_get_logsreads sensitive dataserver_get_webhooknetwork egressserver_list_filesreads sensitive dataserver_test_webhooknetwork egressserver_update_webhooknetwork egresscrafty_api_infono sensitive capability
Show 46 more tools ↓
crafty_get_configno sensitive capabilitycrafty_get_schemano sensitive capabilitycrafty_get_statsno sensitive capabilitycrafty_list_schemasno sensitive capabilitycrafty_loginno sensitive capabilitycrafty_update_configno sensitive capabilityrole_createno sensitive capabilityrole_deleteno sensitive capabilityrole_getno sensitive capabilityrole_listno sensitive capabilityrole_updateno sensitive capabilityserver_createno sensitive capabilityserver_create_directoryno sensitive capabilityserver_create_taskno sensitive capabilityserver_decompress_fileno sensitive capabilityserver_deleteno sensitive capabilityserver_delete_backupno sensitive capabilityserver_delete_taskno sensitive capabilityserver_getno sensitive capabilityserver_get_backup_configno sensitive capabilityserver_get_fileno sensitive capabilityserver_get_historyno sensitive capabilityserver_get_statsno sensitive capabilityserver_get_taskno sensitive capabilityserver_listno sensitive capabilityserver_list_backupsno sensitive capabilityserver_list_tasksno sensitive capabilityserver_list_webhooksno sensitive capabilityserver_rename_fileno sensitive capabilityserver_restore_backupno sensitive capabilityserver_run_taskno sensitive capabilityserver_send_commandno sensitive capabilityserver_updateno sensitive capabilityserver_update_backup_configno sensitive capabilityserver_update_fileno sensitive capabilityserver_update_taskno sensitive capabilityuser_createno sensitive capabilityuser_create_api_keyno sensitive capabilityuser_deleteno sensitive capabilityuser_delete_api_keyno sensitive capabilityuser_getno sensitive capabilityuser_get_api_keysno sensitive capabilityuser_get_permissionsno sensitive capabilityuser_listno sensitive capabilityuser_updateno sensitive capabilityuser_update_permissionsno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (56 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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