Cortexgraph — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "cortexgraph",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "cortexgraph"
},
"server": {
"name": "cortexgraph"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 91,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 1.2,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (13 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (site/assets/javascripts/lunr/wordcut.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`site/assets/javascripts/lunr/wordcut.js:5977`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "site/assets/javascripts/lunr/wordcut.js"
},
"evidence": "ry { var render = new Function(settings.variable || 'obj', '_', source); } catch (e) { e.source = source",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "site/assets/javascripts/lunr/wordcut.js",
"line": 5977,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (site/assets/javascripts/lunr/wordcut.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`site/assets/javascripts/lunr/wordcut.js:5977`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "site/assets/javascripts/lunr/wordcut.js"
},
"evidence": "ry { var render = new Function(settings.variable || 'obj', '_', source); } catch (e) { e.source = source",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "site/assets/javascripts/lunr/wordcut.js",
"line": 5977,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/cortexgraph/agents/beads_integration.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/cortexgraph/agents/beads_integration.py:68`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/cortexgraph/agents/beads_integration.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/cortexgraph/agents/beads_integration.py",
"line": 68,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (tests/test_security_secrets.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `tests/test_security_secrets.py:377`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_security_secrets.py"
},
"evidence": "JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "jwt",
"file": "tests/test_security_secrets.py",
"line": 377
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"cortexgraph\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "cortexgraph"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "auto_recall_process_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "backfill_embeddings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cluster_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "consolidate_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_relation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "observe_memory_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "open_memories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_performance_metrics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reset_performance_metrics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "promote_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_graph",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "touch_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "0b2c5c23a1da5dfafa8286c8a920a057350ea0a8b419df2bfa8d5128e4df0798",
"stats": {
"tools": 13,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 1
}
}
}