Coros Training MCP Server
coros-training-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.0
Published by dholliday3 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (auth/encrypted_store.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`auth/encrypted_store.py:34`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ss result = subprocess.run( ["ioreg", "-rd1", "-c", "IOPlatformExpertDevice"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server auth/encrypted_store.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (installer/assistants.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`installer/assistants.py:191`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: if nothing's there. subprocess.run( ["claude", "mcp", "remove", MCP_ENTRY_NAME], capture_output=True
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server installer/assistants.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (installer/smoke.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`installer/smoke.py:53`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.Popen( server_command, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, std
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server installer/smoke.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (traininghub_live_builder_catalog.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`traininghub_live_builder_catalog.py:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: str) -> str: return subprocess.check_output( [ "security", "find-generic-password",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server traininghub_live_builder_catalog.py
Tools 26
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_activity_detailingests untrusted inputget_daily_metricsingests untrusted inputget_sleep_dataingests untrusted inputget_workoutingests untrusted inputauthenticate_corosno sensitive capabilityauthenticate_coros_mobileno sensitive capabilitycheck_coros_authno sensitive capabilitycreate_run_workoutno sensitive capabilitycreate_strength_workoutno sensitive capabilitycreate_workoutno sensitive capability
Show 16 more tools ↓
delete_workoutno sensitive capabilityexport_activity_fileno sensitive capabilityget_run_workout_schemano sensitive capabilityget_strength_workout_schemano sensitive capabilityget_workout_builder_catalogno sensitive capabilitylist_activitiesno sensitive capabilitylist_exercisesno sensitive capabilitylist_planned_activitiesno sensitive capabilitylist_scheduled_workoutsno sensitive capabilitylist_workoutsno sensitive capabilitymove_scheduled_workoutno sensitive capabilityremove_scheduled_workoutno sensitive capabilityreplace_scheduled_workoutno sensitive capabilityschedule_workoutno sensitive capabilityupdate_run_workoutno sensitive capabilityupdate_workoutno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan coros-training-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Lifestyle & Local
Security scan results for the Atrium MCP server.
Security scan results for the Autotel Mcp Instrumentation MCP server.
Security scan results for the Avalanche Org MCP server.
Security scan results for the Betaflight MCP server.
Security scan results for the Camptocamp MCP server.
Security scan results for the Cariot MCP server.