Sftp MCP Server
@cordfuse/sftp-mcp
npm
v0.1.0
Published by @cordfuse — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
SFTP as a browsable filesystem for AI agents (MCP): list, stat, move, mkdir, delete, batch, upload, download — not just upload/download. Node, stdio + streamable HTTP.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Shell command embedded in tool metadata MTC-INJ-CMD-1 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 8 = 91. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_file → list_files → upload_file. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow download_file → list_files → upload_file
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/sftp.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/sftp.js:8`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const DEFAULT_KEYS = ["id_ed25519", "id_ecdsa", "id_rsa"]; /** * Resolve authentication for a connection. Priority: in
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sftp.js
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
low Shell command embedded in tool metadataMTC-INJ-CMD-1
Shell command embedded in tool metadata detected in the description of tool "delete_dir". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: rm -rf
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool delete_dir · description
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "list_files"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "list_files" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool list_files · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "delete_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "delete_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool delete_file · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 17
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
delete_filewrites filesdownload_fileingests untrusted inputdownload_filesingests untrusted inputlist_filesreads sensitive dataupload_filenetwork egresschmodno sensitive capabilitydelete_dirno sensitive capabilitydisk_usageno sensitive capabilitylstatno sensitive capabilitymake_directoryno sensitive capability
Show 7 more tools ↓
moveno sensitive capabilityread_symlinkno sensitive capabilityrealpathno sensitive capabilitystatno sensitive capabilitysymlinkno sensitive capabilitytest_connectionno sensitive capabilityupload_dirno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0 latest |
A 91/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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