Copilot Money (ignaciohermosillacornejo) MCP Server
copilot-money-mcp
npm
v2.3.0
Source verified
Published by ignaciohermosillacornejo — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Copilot Money — query personal finances locally (14 cache-mode read tools), opt into GraphQL-backed live reads with --live-reads (21 read tools: 8 cache + 13 live), and manage data via Copilot's GraphQL API (17 write tools, opt-in with --wr
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.8 = 98. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.8 | Hardcoded Google API key in server code ×2 MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 98 − 6 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:2892`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const val
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/server.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:2891`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const val
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.js
low Hardcoded Google API key in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded Google API key (a public Firebase/web API key) appears in `dist/cli.js:40964`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: Google API key: AIza…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server dist/cli.js
low Hardcoded Google API key in server code (dist/server.js)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded Google API key (a public Firebase/web API key) appears in `dist/server.js:40963`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: Google API key: AIza…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server dist/server.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.3.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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