Coolify (wrediam) MCP Server

coolify-mcp-server npm v4.1.1

Published by wrediam — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for Coolify v4.1.1 API — full coverage of all endpoints

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Trust grade

93/100

Last scanned 2026-09-07 get badge →

Trust

A · 93/100

Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.

Capability

High

Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.

Coverage

Source

How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.

A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

Points	Adoption-risk factor
−6	capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1	publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 24

high Read-and-egress in one tool: "create_github_app"MTC-FLOW-003

Tool "create_github_app" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.

Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.

Location: flow create_github_app

high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004

Tools that read sensitive data ([get_environment, create_github_app]) and tools that can send data out ([create_hetzner_server, create_public_application, update_application, create_application_scheduled_task, create_service_scheduled_task, create_github_app]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.

Evidence: sources [get_environment, create_github_app] → sinks [create_hetzner_server, create_public_application, update_application, create_application_scheduled_task, c

Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.

Location: flow get_environment → create_hetzner_server

high Tool "create_hetzner_server" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "create_hetzner_server" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool create_hetzner_server

high Tool "create_public_application" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "create_public_application" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool create_public_application

high Tool "update_application" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "update_application" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool update_application

high Tool "create_application_scheduled_task" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "create_application_scheduled_task" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool create_application_scheduled_task

high Tool "create_service_scheduled_task" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "create_service_scheduled_task" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool create_service_scheduled_task

high Shell/command execution in server code (test-tools.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`test-tools.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import { dirname, join } from 'path';

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server test-tools.js

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "api_url" on "create_github_app"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "create_github_app" takes a URL/host parameter "api_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool create_github_app · inputSchema.properties.api_url

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "html_url" on "create_github_app"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "create_github_app" takes a URL/host parameter "html_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool create_github_app · inputSchema.properties.html_url

medium Unconstrained command parameter "cloud_init_script" on "create_hetzner_server"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "create_hetzner_server" takes a command-shaped parameter "cloud_init_script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.