Context Mapper MCP Server
context-mapper-mcp
npm
v1.1.0
Source verified
Published by thijs-hakkenberg — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Domain-Driven Design with Context Mapper CML
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/generators/cli/executor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/generators/cli/executor.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { stat } from 'fs/promises'; import { getCLIConfig, getJavaExecutablePath
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/generators/cli/executor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/generators/cli/manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/generators/cli/manager.js:186`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = await import('child_process'); return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { const ps = spawn(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/generators/cli/manager.js
Tools 47
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
cml_download_cliingests untrusted inputcml_add_commandno sensitive capabilitycml_add_domain_eventno sensitive capabilitycml_add_entityno sensitive capabilitycml_add_identifierno sensitive capabilitycml_add_serviceno sensitive capabilitycml_add_value_objectno sensitive capabilitycml_batch_add_elementsno sensitive capabilitycml_cli_statusno sensitive capabilitycml_configure_clino sensitive capability
Show 37 more tools ↓
cml_create_aggregateno sensitive capabilitycml_create_bounded_contextno sensitive capabilitycml_create_context_mapno sensitive capabilitycml_create_modelno sensitive capabilitycml_create_relationshipno sensitive capabilitycml_delete_aggregateno sensitive capabilitycml_delete_bounded_contextno sensitive capabilitycml_delete_commandno sensitive capabilitycml_delete_domain_eventno sensitive capabilitycml_delete_entityno sensitive capabilitycml_delete_relationshipno sensitive capabilitycml_delete_serviceno sensitive capabilitycml_delete_value_objectno sensitive capabilitycml_find_elementsno sensitive capabilitycml_generate_aggregate_diagramno sensitive capabilitycml_generate_context_map_diagramno sensitive capabilitycml_generate_context_map_imageno sensitive capabilitycml_generate_from_templateno sensitive capabilitycml_generate_full_diagramno sensitive capabilitycml_generate_full_reportno sensitive capabilitycml_generate_glossaryno sensitive capabilitycml_generate_jhipster_jdlno sensitive capabilitycml_generate_mdslno sensitive capabilitycml_get_aggregateno sensitive capabilitycml_get_bounded_contextno sensitive capabilitycml_get_model_infono sensitive capabilitycml_get_relationshipno sensitive capabilitycml_list_aggregatesno sensitive capabilitycml_list_bounded_contextsno sensitive capabilitycml_list_generatorsno sensitive capabilitycml_list_relationshipsno sensitive capabilitycml_load_modelno sensitive capabilitycml_save_modelno sensitive capabilitycml_update_aggregateno sensitive capabilitycml_update_bounded_contextno sensitive capabilitycml_update_relationshipno sensitive capabilitycml_validate_modelno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (47 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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