Context Gatekeeper — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "context-gatekeeper",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "context-gatekeeper"
},
"server": {
"name": "context-gatekeeper"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (25 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (bin/context-gatekeeper-cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/context-gatekeeper-cli.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "bin/context-gatekeeper-cli.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'; import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "bin/context-gatekeeper-cli.js",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/services/embedding-provider.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/services/embedding-provider.js:137`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/services/embedding-provider.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch('https://api.cohere.ai/v1/embed', { method: 'POST', headers: {",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/services/embedding-provider.js",
"line": 137,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/services/llm.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/services/llm.js:183`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/services/llm.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/models', { headers: { 'Authorization': `Bea",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/services/llm.js",
"line": 183,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/agents/base.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/agents/base.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/scripts/agents/base.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { writeFileSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs'; import",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/scripts/agents/base.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/agents/base.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/agents/base.ts:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/scripts/agents/base.ts"
},
"evidence": "ildProcess } from 'node:child_process'; import { writeFileSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs'; impo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/scripts/agents/base.ts",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/cli/config-gen.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/cli/config-gen.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/scripts/cli/config-gen.js"
},
"evidence": "hildProcess = cjs('node:child_process'); /** * Resolve an absolute, system-level `node` binary path. Cursor ships its",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/scripts/cli/config-gen.js",
"line": 22,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/cli/config-gen.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/cli/config-gen.ts:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/scripts/cli/config-gen.ts"
},
"evidence": "hildProcess = cjs('node:child_process') as typeof import('node:child_process'); /** * Resolve an absolute, system-leve",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/scripts/cli/config-gen.ts",
"line": 27,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "memory_store",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_recall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_anchor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_report_usage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "context_compress",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "project_create",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_store_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_delete_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "configure_llm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "configure_embedding",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_extract",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "intelligent_recall",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dual_mode_execute",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "db_flush",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "watchdog_manage",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gdpr_export",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gdpr_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "data_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_store",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "after_chain_configure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "168b0efcae89977958265eaff4181990c309dc1287d7b4090ca72dffa478c6fb",
"stats": {
"tools": 25,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 2,
"low": 4,
"info": 0
}
}
}