Configflux Weld MCP Server
configflux-weld
PyPI
v0.22.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 9.5 = 91. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Unsafe deserialization ×2 MTC-SRC-007 | permissions |
2. Client adoption risk — 91 − 8 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Shell/command execution in server code (_discover_strategies.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`_discover_strategies.py:143`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( argv, capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=str(root), tim
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server _discover_strategies.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (_git.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`_git.py:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server _git.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (_impact_git.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`_impact_git.py:95`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( cmd, check=True, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server _impact_git.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (_review.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`_review.py:81`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: out = subprocess.run( ["git", "config", "user.email"], check=False, capture_ou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server _review.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (_workspace_inspect.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`_workspace_inspect.py:98`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: C_ALL": "C"} proc = subprocess.run( ["git", *args], cwd=str(repo_root), capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server _workspace_inspect.py
medium Unsafe deserialization (_discover_sidecar.py)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`_discover_sidecar.py:60`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: alse envelope = pickle.loads(path.read_bytes()) if not isinstance(envelope, dict): return Fa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server _discover_sidecar.py
medium Unsafe deserialization (_query_sidecar.py)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`_query_sidecar.py:107`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: es() envelope = pickle.loads(raw) if not _envelope_matches(envelope, graph_path, nodes, edges):
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server _query_sidecar.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (bench/_public_corpus.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`bench/_public_corpus.py:60`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: d without ``shell=True`` so injection cannot land arbitrary code. produces: Repo-relative file that
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bench/_public_corpus.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (bench/_public_setup.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`bench/_public_setup.py:115`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: patch it.""" return subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 -- args bounded and validated above cmd, cwd=str(c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bench/_public_setup.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (bench/adapters/graphify.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`bench/adapters/graphify.py:52`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: mock it.""" return subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 -- bounded, args validated above cmd, cwd=str(cwd)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bench/adapters/graphify.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (bench/adapters/tree_sitter.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`bench/adapters/tree_sitter.py:43`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: mock it.""" return subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 -- bounded, args validated above cmd, cwd=str(cwd)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bench/adapters/tree_sitter.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (bench/primitives.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`bench/primitives.py:105`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( ["git", "-C", str(root), "ls-files"], capture_output=Tru
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bench/primitives.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.22.0 latest |
B 83/100 | 12 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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