Computer Use (vincenthopf) MCP Server
computer-use-mcp
PyPI
v1.0.0
Published by vincenthopf — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Production-ready MCP server providing AI-powered web browsing automation using Gemini 2.5 Computer Use API
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (.claude/status_lines/status_line.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`.claude/status_lines/status_line.py:58`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ['git', 'rev-parse', '--abbrev-ref', 'HEAD'], capture_ou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .claude/status_lines/status_line.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (.claude/status_lines/status_line_v2.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`.claude/status_lines/status_line_v2.py:62`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ['git', 'rev-parse', '--abbrev-ref', 'HEAD'], capture_ou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .claude/status_lines/status_line_v2.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (.claude/status_lines/status_line_v3.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`.claude/status_lines/status_line_v3.py:63`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ['git', 'rev-parse', '--abbrev-ref', 'HEAD'], capture_ou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .claude/status_lines/status_line_v3.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (.claude/status_lines/status_line_v4.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`.claude/status_lines/status_line_v4.py:63`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ['git', 'rev-parse', '--abbrev-ref', 'HEAD'], capture_ou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server .claude/status_lines/status_line_v4.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (test_server.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`test_server.py:84`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(module_name) print(f"✓ {package_name}") except ImportError:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test_server.py
Tools 7
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browse_webingests untrusted inputget_web_screenshotsingests untrusted inputcheck_web_taskno sensitive capabilitylist_web_tasksno sensitive capabilitystart_web_taskno sensitive capabilitystop_web_taskno sensitive capabilitywaitno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (7 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan computer-use-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Computer Use 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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