Computer Control Mcp Enhanced MCP Server
computer-control-mcp-enhanced
PyPI
v0.4.10
Published by gzmagyari — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Enhanced MCP server for computer control: mouse, keyboard, screenshots, OCR, UI automation, region capture, accessibility-aware app launching. Fork of computer-control-mcp with major perception and automation improvements.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (computer_control_mcp/accessibility_launcher.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`computer_control_mcp/accessibility_launcher.py:314`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( list(cmd), check=False, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server computer_control_mcp/accessibility_launcher.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (computer_control_mcp/core.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`computer_control_mcp/core.py:767`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: process = subprocess.run( ["powershell", "-NoProfile", "-Command", "[Co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server computer_control_mcp/core.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (computer_control_mcp/ui_automation.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`computer_control_mcp/ui_automation.py:587`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["xprop", "-root", "_NET_CLIENT_LIST_STACKING"], captu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server computer_control_mcp/ui_automation.py
Tools 95
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
activate_hyperlinkno sensitive capabilityactivate_windowno sensitive capabilitycapture_region_aroundno sensitive capabilitycheck_ocr_changedno sensitive capabilitycheck_screen_changedno sensitive capabilitycheck_screen_changed_fullno sensitive capabilitycheck_screen_changed_with_imagesno sensitive capabilitycheck_ui_automation_changedno sensitive capabilityclick_screenno sensitive capabilityclick_textno sensitive capability
Show 85 more tools ↓
close_windowno sensitive capabilitycollapse_elementno sensitive capabilitydrag_mouseno sensitive capabilityexpand_elementno sensitive capabilityfill_file_dialogno sensitive capabilityfill_text_fieldno sensitive capabilityfind_textno sensitive capabilityfind_ui_elementsno sensitive capabilityfocus_elementno sensitive capabilityget_active_windowno sensitive capabilityget_agent_guideno sensitive capabilityget_app_infono sensitive capabilityget_clipboardno sensitive capabilityget_cursor_positionno sensitive capabilityget_drag_infono sensitive capabilityget_element_at_pointno sensitive capabilityget_element_childrenno sensitive capabilityget_element_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_element_parentno sensitive capabilityget_element_textno sensitive capabilityget_element_viewsno sensitive capabilityget_file_watch_eventsno sensitive capabilityget_focused_elementno sensitive capabilityget_hyperlinksno sensitive capabilityget_monitorsno sensitive capabilityget_mouse_positionno sensitive capabilityget_screen_sizeno sensitive capabilityget_scroll_infono sensitive capabilityget_system_infono sensitive capabilityget_table_datano sensitive capabilityget_text_at_offsetno sensitive capabilityget_text_boundsno sensitive capabilityget_text_caret_offsetno sensitive capabilityget_text_selectionno sensitive capabilityhover_and_captureno sensitive capabilityinvoke_elementno sensitive capabilityis_app_runningno sensitive capabilitykey_downno sensitive capabilitykey_upno sensitive capabilitykill_processno sensitive capabilitylaunch_appno sensitive capabilitylist_processesno sensitive capabilitylist_windowsno sensitive capabilitymaximize_windowno sensitive capabilityminimize_windowno sensitive capabilitymouse_downno sensitive capabilitymouse_upno sensitive capabilitymove_element_uino sensitive capabilitymove_mouseno sensitive capabilitymove_windowno sensitive capabilityperform_actionsno sensitive capabilitypress_keysno sensitive capabilityrealize_elementno sensitive capabilityresize_element_uino sensitive capabilityresize_windowno sensitive capabilityrestore_windowno sensitive capabilityscrollno sensitive capabilityscroll_element_containerno sensitive capabilityscroll_element_into_viewno sensitive capabilityselect_elementno sensitive capabilityselect_text_by_searchno sensitive capabilityselect_text_rangeno sensitive capabilityset_clipboardno sensitive capabilityset_element_extentsno sensitive capabilityset_element_range_valueno sensitive capabilityset_element_textno sensitive capabilityset_element_viewno sensitive capabilityset_text_caret_offsetno sensitive capabilitysnap_windowno sensitive capabilitystart_file_watchno sensitive capabilitystop_file_watchno sensitive capabilitytake_screenshotno sensitive capabilitytake_screenshot_fullno sensitive capabilitytake_screenshot_with_ocrno sensitive capabilitytake_screenshot_with_ui_automationno sensitive capabilitytoggle_elementno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilityui_actionno sensitive capabilitywait_for_elementno sensitive capabilitywait_for_file_changeno sensitive capabilitywait_for_focused_elementno sensitive capabilitywait_for_screen_changeno sensitive capabilitywait_for_textno sensitive capabilitywait_for_windowno sensitive capabilitywait_millisecondsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (95 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.10 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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