Sdk (commoncompute) MCP Server
@commoncompute/sdk
npm
v0.2.0
Published by @commoncompute — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-E56TUHYC.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-E56TUHYC.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { promises as fs } from "fs"; import { homedir, hostname } from "os"; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-E56TUHYC.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.cjs:449`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child = (0, import_node_child_process.spawn)(opener, [url], { detached: true, stdio: "ignore" }); child.on("error",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:1186`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; var playground = { name: "playground", category: "misc", summary: "Open th
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp/server.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/server.cjs:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: auth.ts var import_node_child_process = require("child_process"); var import_node_fs = require("fs"); var import_node_os
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/server.cjs
Tools 71
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
cc_get_jobingests untrusted inputcc_get_job_eventsingests untrusted inputcc_get_modelingests untrusted inputcc_get_workloadingests untrusted inputcc_list_keysreads sensitive datascopeingests untrusted inputapi-keyno sensitive capabilityarray-sizeno sensitive capabilitycc_cancel_jobno sensitive capabilitycc_chatno sensitive capability
Show 61 more tools ↓
cc_create_keyno sensitive capabilitycc_embedno sensitive capabilitycc_generate_imageno sensitive capabilitycc_get_balanceno sensitive capabilitycc_get_billing_historyno sensitive capabilitycc_get_job_result_urlno sensitive capabilitycc_get_usageno sensitive capabilitycc_list_modelsno sensitive capabilitycc_list_workloadsno sensitive capabilitycc_preview_job_resultno sensitive capabilitycc_quote_jobno sensitive capabilitycc_revoke_keyno sensitive capabilitycc_submit_jobno sensitive capabilitycc_transcribe_audiono sensitive capabilitycc_wait_for_jobno sensitive capabilitycc_whoamino sensitive capabilitycommandno sensitive capabilityendno sensitive capabilityformatno sensitive capabilitygranularityno sensitive capabilitygroup-byno sensitive capabilityidno sensitive capabilityidempotency-keyno sensitive capabilityJob eventsno sensitive capabilityJob snapshotno sensitive capabilityjob-definitionno sensitive capabilityjob-nameno sensitive capabilityjobsno sensitive capabilityjsonno sensitive capabilitylimitno sensitive capabilityloginno sensitive capabilitymaxno sensitive capabilitymax-spend-usdno sensitive capabilitymodeno sensitive capabilitymodelno sensitive capabilityModel catalogno sensitive capabilityModel specno sensitive capabilitynameno sensitive capabilityno-browserno sensitive capabilityno-jsonno sensitive capabilityno-streamno sensitive capabilityoutno sensitive capabilitypasteno sensitive capabilitypayloadno sensitive capabilityportno sensitive capabilitypriorityno sensitive capabilitypromptno sensitive capabilityquietno sensitive capabilityreasonno sensitive capabilitystartno sensitive capabilitystateno sensitive capabilitystatusno sensitive capabilitytextno sensitive capabilitytimeoutno sensitive capabilitytransportno sensitive capabilitytypeno sensitive capabilityunitsno sensitive capabilitywaitno sensitive capabilityworkloadno sensitive capabilityWorkload catalogno sensitive capabilityWorkload specno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (71 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @commoncompute/sdk --onlineOther implementations of Sdk 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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