Coingecko MCP Server
@coingecko/coingecko-mcp
npm
v8.0.0
Source verified
Published by coingecko — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The official MCP Server for the Coingecko API
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (code-tool.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`code-tool.js:154`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: mportStar(require('node:child_process'))); try { execSync('command -v deno', { stdio: 'ignore' }); d
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server code-tool.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (code-tool.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`code-tool.mjs:118`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import('node:child_process'); try { execSync('command -v deno', { stdio: 'ignore' }); den
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server code-tool.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/code-tool.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/code-tool.ts:163`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import('node:child_process'); try { execSync('command -v deno', { stdio: 'ignore' }); denoPath = 'd
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/code-tool.ts
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (code-tool-worker.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`code-tool-worker.js:46`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .then(s => __importStar(require(s))); } function getRunFunctionSource(code) { const sourceFile = typescript_1.defaul
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server code-tool-worker.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v8.0.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v7.1.0 |
A 94/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @coingecko/coingecko-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Coingecko 4
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 5 side by side →
Market data for 15,000+ cryptocurrencies — prices, history, trends, and deep coin metadata via CoinGecko.
CoinGecko MCP — wraps CoinGecko free API (no auth required)
MCP server for CoinGecko — crypto prices, market data, trending coins, and OHLC charts for Claude, Cursor, and AI agents
MCP server for CoinGecko — free crypto market data API for AI assistants
More in Finance & Commerce
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
Signed verification attestations for agent decisions: business, price, freshness, claim checks.
Actual Budget MCP server exposing API functionality
MCP server for Actual Budget - query and manage your personal finances through Claude
The Adyen Model Context Protocol server allows you to integrate with Adyen APIs through LLMs function calling utilizing various Clients. It currently supports the following tools:
Trusted agent-commerce hub: discover, trust-check, and route x402 payments with failover.