Raw scan report

Codewikitap — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.9.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "codewikitap",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "codewikitap"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "codewikitap"
    }
  },
  "grade": "B",
  "score": {
    "score": 83,
    "threatScore": 93,
    "grade": "B",
    "band": "B",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 6.3,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 1.2,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "category": "injection",
        "severity": "medium",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 9,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 6.3
      },
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
        "category": "supply-chain",
        "severity": "low",
        "confidence": "heuristic",
        "rawWeight": 3,
        "confidenceMult": 0.4,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 1.2
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "critical",
        "label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 10
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "critical",
    "reasons": [
      "ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
      "can execute shell commands or code",
      "untrusted input can reach code execution"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "untrusted-input",
      "code-exec"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": true,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "Tools were statically extracted from the published source (3 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/adapters/sqlite_store.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/adapters/sqlite_store.js:69`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/adapters/sqlite_store.js"
      },
      "evidence": "vecAvailable, exec(sql) { handle.exec(sql); }, prepare(sql) { const stmt = handle.prepare(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/adapters/sqlite_store.js",
        "line": 69,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/heap_cap.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/heap_cap.js:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/heap_cap.js"
      },
      "evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; /** Type guard for `HeapCapShutdownMessage` on the receiving end (src/index.ts).",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/heap_cap.js",
        "line": 31,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/index.js"
      },
      "evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import { StdioServerTransport } from '",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/index.js",
        "line": 11,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
      "title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/services/cache.js)",
      "category": "injection",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/services/cache.js:148`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/services/cache.js"
      },
      "evidence": "this.store.exec(trimmed + ';'); } } // v2 → v3: add edge_count column to existi",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "file": "dist/services/cache.js",
        "line": 148,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/postinstall.mjs)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/postinstall.mjs:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "scripts/postinstall.mjs"
      },
      "evidence": "{ execSync } from 'node:child_process'; const SKIP = process.env.CODEWIKI_SKIP_POSTINSTALL === '1'; const isTTY = proce",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "scripts/postinstall.mjs",
        "line": 22,
        "nonRuntime": true
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
      "title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
      "category": "supply-chain",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "\"codewikitap\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
      "remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "package",
        "name": "codewikitap"
      },
      "evidence": "node scripts/postinstall.mjs",
      "owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
        "https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
      ],
      "data": {
        "scripts": [
          "postinstall"
        ]
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [
    {
      "tool": "get_page",
      "tags": [
        "untrusted-input"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "untrusted-input": [
          "keyword \"fetch\""
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "tool": "list_project_dependencies",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "resolve_repo",
      "tags": [
        "untrusted-input"
      ],
      "reasons": {
        "untrusted-input": [
          "keyword \"get_page\""
        ]
      }
    }
  ],
  "surfaceDigest": "48fd0d2d7f0861455a7c8cfc3d7f4783474b47390cb9008dfc3c3b3f11567913",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 3,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 3,
      "medium": 1,
      "low": 2,
      "info": 0
    }
  }
}