Raw scan report

Codeseeker — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.5.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "codeseeker",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "codeseeker"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "codeseeker"
    }
  },
  "grade": "C",
  "score": {
    "score": 78,
    "grade": "C",
    "band": "C",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 15.4,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 6.3,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
        "category": "injection",
        "severity": "high",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 22,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 15.4
      },
      {
        "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
        "category": "supply-chain",
        "severity": "medium",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 9,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 6.3
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "can send data / act on an external service",
      "reads sensitive or local data",
      "has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
      "can execute shell commands or code"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "sensitive-source",
      "code-exec",
      "external-sink"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": false,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
      "title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/mcp/indexing-service.js)",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp/indexing-service.js:115`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/mcp/indexing-service.js"
      },
      "evidence": "id_rsa",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
        "file": "dist/mcp/indexing-service.js",
        "line": 115
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
      "title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/cli/quality/services/compilation-service.js)",
      "category": "injection",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/quality/services/compilation-service.js:122`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/quality/services/compilation-service.js"
      },
      "evidence": "new Function(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
        "file": "dist/cli/quality/services/compilation-service.js",
        "line": 122
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
      "title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/cli/quality/services/compilation-service.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/quality/services/compilation-service.js:122`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/quality/services/compilation-service.js"
      },
      "evidence": "new Function(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
        "file": "dist/cli/quality/services/compilation-service.js",
        "line": 122
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
      "title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/cli/quality/services/security-service.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/quality/services/security-service.js:154`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/quality/services/security-service.js"
      },
      "evidence": "eval(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
        "file": "dist/cli/quality/services/security-service.js",
        "line": 154
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
      "title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/cli/services/data/embedding/providers/xenova-provider.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/services/data/embedding/providers/xenova-provider.js:25`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/services/data/embedding/providers/xenova-provider.js"
      },
      "evidence": "eval(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
        "file": "dist/cli/services/data/embedding/providers/xenova-provider.js",
        "line": 25
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
      "title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/shared/intelligent-cycle/services/security-scanning-service.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/shared/intelligent-cycle/services/security-scanning-service.js:41`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/shared/intelligent-cycle/services/security-scanning-service.js"
      },
      "evidence": "eval(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
        "file": "dist/shared/intelligent-cycle/services/security-scanning-service.js",
        "line": 41
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
      "title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/shared/validation-cycle/services/core-safety-service.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/shared/validation-cycle/services/core-safety-service.js:277`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/shared/validation-cycle/services/core-safety-service.js"
      },
      "evidence": "eval(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
        "file": "dist/shared/validation-cycle/services/core-safety-service.js",
        "line": 277
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/analyzers/change-analyzer.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/analyzers/change-analyzer.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/analyzers/change-analyzer.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/cli/analyzers/change-analyzer.js",
        "line": 7
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/command-router.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/command-router.js:431`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/commands/command-router.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/cli/commands/command-router.js",
        "line": 431
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/services/user-interaction-service.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/services/user-interaction-service.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/commands/services/user-interaction-service.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/cli/commands/services/user-interaction-service.js",
        "line": 13
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands/services/workflow-orchestrator.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands/services/workflow-orchestrator.js:60`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/commands/services/workflow-orchestrator.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/cli/commands/services/workflow-orchestrator.js",
        "line": 60
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/features/compilation/verifier.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/features/compilation/verifier.js:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/features/compilation/verifier.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/cli/features/compilation/verifier.js",
        "line": 44
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/git/git-commit-utils.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/git/git-commit-utils.js:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/git/git-commit-utils.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/cli/git/git-commit-utils.js",
        "line": 42
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/git/services/git-analysis-service.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/git/services/git-analysis-service.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/git/services/git-analysis-service.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/cli/git/services/git-analysis-service.js",
        "line": 8
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/git/services/git-autocommit-service.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/git/services/git-autocommit-service.js:41`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/git/services/git-autocommit-service.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/cli/git/services/git-autocommit-service.js",
        "line": 41
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/git/services/git-operations-service.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/git/services/git-operations-service.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/git/services/git-operations-service.js"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/cli/git/services/git-operations-service.js",
        "line": 8
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/managers/claude-code-forwarder.d.ts)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/managers/claude-code-forwarder.d.ts:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/managers/claude-code-forwarder.d.ts"
      },
      "evidence": "child_process",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/cli/managers/claude-code-forwarder.d.ts",
        "line": 7
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
      "title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/cli/services/data/content-processing/content-processor.js)",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/services/data/content-processing/content-processor.js:58`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/services/data/content-processing/content-processor.js"
      },
      "evidence": "fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/embeddings'",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
        "file": "dist/cli/services/data/content-processing/content-processor.js",
        "line": 58
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
      "title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/shared/hybrid-file-discovery.js)",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/shared/hybrid-file-discovery.js:248`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/shared/hybrid-file-discovery.js"
      },
      "evidence": "fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/embeddings'",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
        "file": "dist/shared/hybrid-file-discovery.js",
        "line": 248
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
      "title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (bin/codeseeker.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`bin/codeseeker.js:137`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "bin/codeseeker.js"
      },
      "evidence": "require(cliPath)",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
        "file": "bin/codeseeker.js",
        "line": 137
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
      "title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/cli/services/data/semantic-graph/parsers/tree-sitter-java-parser.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/services/data/semantic-graph/parsers/tree-sitter-java-parser.js:74`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/services/data/semantic-graph/parsers/tree-sitter-java-parser.js"
      },
      "evidence": "require(s)",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
        "file": "dist/cli/services/data/semantic-graph/parsers/tree-sitter-java-parser.js",
        "line": 74
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
      "title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/cli/services/data/semantic-graph/parsers/tree-sitter-python-parser.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/services/data/semantic-graph/parsers/tree-sitter-python-parser.js:76`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/services/data/semantic-graph/parsers/tree-sitter-python-parser.js"
      },
      "evidence": "require(s)",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
        "file": "dist/cli/services/data/semantic-graph/parsers/tree-sitter-python-parser.js",
        "line": 76
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
      "title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/cli/services/data/semantic-graph/tree-sitter-semantic-builder.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/services/data/semantic-graph/tree-sitter-semantic-builder.js:69`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/cli/services/data/semantic-graph/tree-sitter-semantic-builder.js"
      },
      "evidence": "require(packageName)",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
        "file": "dist/cli/services/data/semantic-graph/tree-sitter-semantic-builder.js",
        "line": 69
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
      "title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/shared/tool-registry-initializer.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/shared/tool-registry-initializer.js:87`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/shared/tool-registry-initializer.js"
      },
      "evidence": "require(tryPath)",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
        "file": "dist/shared/tool-registry-initializer.js",
        "line": 87
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
      "title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
      "category": "supply-chain",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "\"codeseeker\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. The large majority of malicious packages abuse install hooks to run code before you ever import them.",
      "remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "package",
        "name": "codeseeker"
      },
      "owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
      "references": [
        "https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
        "https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
      ],
      "data": {
        "scripts": [
          "postinstall"
        ]
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [],
  "surfaceDigest": "b101b5a041f7ae674984b34ec00e612c688c7049190cdeaabf9c9ef74b7501b5",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 0,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 17,
      "medium": 8,
      "low": 0,
      "info": 0
    }
  }
}