Coder (coder-mcp) MCP Server

In the server's implementation (`coder_mcp/analysis/visitors/python_visitor.py:227`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: "Usage of eval() function detected", "Avoid eval() - use safer alternatives like ast.l

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server coder_mcp/analysis/visitors/python_visitor.py

In the server's implementation (`coder_mcp/analysis/dependency_analyzer.py:630`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: on"] proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30) if proc.returncode

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server coder_mcp/analysis/dependency_analyzer.py

In the server's implementation (`coder_mcp/analysis/detectors/security/injection.py:87`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: ized commands, " "avoid shell=True" ), ) def _create_path_traversal_pattern(self) -> Vulnerabil

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server coder_mcp/analysis/detectors/security/injection.py

In the server's implementation (`coder_mcp/analysis/metrics/coverage_reader.py:110`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: ty result = subprocess.run( # nosec B603 [pytest_path, "--cov=coder_mcp", "--cov-report=jso

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server coder_mcp/analysis/metrics/coverage_reader.py

In the server's implementation (`coder_mcp/analysis/visitors/python_visitor.py:240`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: "Usage of exec() function detected", "Avoid exec() - use safer alternatives",

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server coder_mcp/analysis/visitors/python_visitor.py

Tool "edit_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "edit_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool edit_file

Tool "write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool write_file

In the server's implementation (`coder_mcp/core/providers/registry.py:244`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: ry: __import__(requirement) except ImportError: self._add_missin

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server coder_mcp/core/providers/registry.py

In the server's implementation (`coder_mcp/context/search/cache.py:96`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: cached_result = pickle.loads(cached_data) # nosec B301 if isinstance(cached_result, list) a

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server coder_mcp/context/search/cache.py

In the server's implementation (`coder_mcp/search/cache.py:33`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: mbedding: List[float] = pickle.loads(cached) # nosec B301 self.embedding_cache.set(cache_key, embedding)

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server coder_mcp/search/cache.py

Tool "edit_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool edit_file

Tool "write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool write_file

Tool "read_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.

Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.

Location: tool read_file · inputSchema.properties.path

Tool "write_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.

Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.

Location: tool write_file · inputSchema.properties.path

Tool "list_files" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.

Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.

Location: tool list_files · inputSchema.properties.path