Codeocean MCP Server
codeocean-mcp-server
PyPI
v0.12.2
Published by codeocean — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Code Ocean MCP Server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/codeocean_mcp_server/models.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/codeocean_mcp_server/models.py:51`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s) module_ns = vars(__import__(data_class.__module__, fromlist=["*"])) type_hints = get_type_hints(data_class, g
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/codeocean_mcp_server/models.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_http_transport.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_http_transport.py:73`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: N", None) process = subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, SERVER_SCRIPT_PATH, "--transport", "streamable-http",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_http_transport.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_logging_config.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_logging_config.py:36`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: G_FORMAT} process = subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, SERVER_SCRIPT_PATH, "--transport", "streamable-http",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_logging_config.py
Tools 10
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
list_data_asset_filesreads sensitive datadelete_computationno sensitive capabilitydetach_computation_data_assetsno sensitive capabilityget_capsule_app_panelno sensitive capabilityget_computationno sensitive capabilityget_custom_metadatano sensitive capabilitylist_computationsno sensitive capabilityrename_computationno sensitive capabilityupdate_metadatano sensitive capabilitywait_until_completedno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (10 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.12.2 latest |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v0.12.1 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
v0.12.0 |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v0.11.0 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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