Codemagic (todah-zg) MCP Server

codemagic-mcp-server npm v1.0.5

Published by todah-zg — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for Codemagic CI/CD and App Store Connect / Google Play — build, sign, and publish mobile apps through AI agents

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Trust grade

93/100

Last scanned 2026-09-07 get badge →

Trust

A · 93/100

Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.

Capability

High

Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.

Coverage

Source

How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.

A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

Points	Adoption-risk factor
−6	capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1	publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 11

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/asc.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/asc.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { createWriteStream } from "node:f

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/asc.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/googleplay.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/googleplay.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { createWriteStream } from "node:f

Location: server dist/googleplay.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; i

Location: server dist/index.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/ssh.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/ssh.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm } from "no

Location: server dist/ssh.js

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([upload_to_testflight, upload_build_to_asc, upload_ios_screenshots, list_builds, get_build, create_public_artifact_url, get_build_logs, upload_to_google_play, get_android_store_listing, upload_android_screenshots, get_test_results]) co-exist with external-action tools ([delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [upload_to_testflight, upload_build_to_asc, upload_ios_screenshots, list_builds, get_build, create_public_artifact_url, get_build_logs, upload_to_goog

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow upload_to_testflight → delete_webhook

medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/yaml.js)MTC-SRC-003

In the server's implementation (`dist/yaml.js:10`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: validatorPromise = fetch("https://codemagic.io/codemagic-schema.json", { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10

Location: server dist/yaml.js

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "ipa_url" on "upload_to_testflight"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "upload_to_testflight" takes a URL/host parameter "ipa_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).