Codegraphcontext — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "codegraphcontext",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "codegraphcontext"
},
"server": {
"name": "codegraphcontext"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/index-C-187lf0.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/index-C-187lf0.js:4558`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/index-C-187lf0.js"
},
"evidence": "{let n=yG(r,e),{Body:i}=new Function(n)();return i}function yG(r,e){return` ${xG(r,e)} ${vG(r)} return {Body: Body, Vect",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/index-C-187lf0.js",
"line": 4558,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/wasm/web-tree-sitter.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/wasm/web-tree-sitter.js:2366`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/wasm/web-tree-sitter.js"
},
"evidence": "moduleExports[name] = eval(func); } __name(addEmJs, \"addEmJs\"); for (var name in moduleExports",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/wasm/web-tree-sitter.js",
"line": 2366,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/index-C-187lf0.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/index-C-187lf0.js:4558`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/index-C-187lf0.js"
},
"evidence": "{let n=yG(r,e),{Body:i}=new Function(n)();return i}function yG(r,e){return` ${xG(r,e)} ${vG(r)} return {Body: Body, Vect",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/index-C-187lf0.js",
"line": 4558,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/parser-pyodide.worker-BgsDfaad.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/parser-pyodide.worker-BgsDfaad.js:5`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/parser-pyodide.worker-BgsDfaad.js"
},
"evidence": "args}) => { ${body} };`;eval(func)}if(__name(addEmAsm,\"addEmAsm\"),\"__start_em_asm\"in moduleExports)for(var start=moduleE",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/parser-pyodide.worker-BgsDfaad.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/parser.worker-_nvrecvj.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/parser.worker-_nvrecvj.js:5`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/parser.worker-_nvrecvj.js"
},
"evidence": "args}) => { ${body} };`;eval(func)}if(__name(addEmAsm,\"addEmAsm\"),\"__start_em_asm\"in moduleExports)for(var start=moduleE",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/parser.worker-_nvrecvj.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/wasm/web-tree-sitter.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/wasm/web-tree-sitter.js:2366`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/wasm/web-tree-sitter.js"
},
"evidence": "moduleExports[name] = eval(func); } __name(addEmJs, \"addEmJs\"); for (var name in moduleExports",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/wasm/web-tree-sitter.js",
"line": 2366,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/codegraphcontext/cli/hook_manager.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/codegraphcontext/cli/hook_manager.py:213`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/codegraphcontext/cli/hook_manager.py"
},
"evidence": "try: return subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"-C\", str(repo_root), *args], check=check,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/codegraphcontext/cli/hook_manager.py",
"line": 213,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/codegraphcontext/cli/setup_wizard.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/codegraphcontext/cli/setup_wizard.py:617`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/codegraphcontext/cli/setup_wizard.py"
},
"evidence": "try: process = subprocess.run( command, shell=shell, check=check,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/codegraphcontext/cli/setup_wizard.py",
"line": 617,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/codegraphcontext/core/database_falkordb.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/codegraphcontext/core/database_falkordb.py:325`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/codegraphcontext/core/database_falkordb.py"
},
"evidence": "self._process = subprocess.Popen(cmd, env=env, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE) # Drain",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/codegraphcontext/core/database_falkordb.py",
"line": 325,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/codegraphcontext/core/simulator.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/codegraphcontext/core/simulator.py:485`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/codegraphcontext/core/simulator.py"
},
"evidence": "ts}\"] res = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=repo_path, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, ch",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/codegraphcontext/core/simulator.py",
"line": 485,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/codegraphcontext/tools/package_resolver.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/codegraphcontext/tools/package_resolver.py:86`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/codegraphcontext/tools/package_resolver.py"
},
"evidence": "ve()) result = subprocess.run([\"npm\", \"root\", \"-g\"], capture_output=True, text=True) if result.returnco",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/codegraphcontext/tools/package_resolver.py",
"line": 86,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/codegraphcontext/tools/scip_indexer.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/codegraphcontext/tools/scip_indexer.py:181`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/codegraphcontext/tools/scip_indexer.py"
},
"evidence": "result = subprocess.run( cmd, cwd=str(project_path),",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/codegraphcontext/tools/scip_indexer.py",
"line": 181,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/codegraphcontext/utils/git_utils.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/codegraphcontext/utils/git_utils.py:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/codegraphcontext/utils/git_utils.py"
},
"evidence": "try: sha = subprocess.check_output( [\"git\", \"rev-parse\", \"HEAD\"], cwd=repo_path,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/codegraphcontext/utils/git_utils.py",
"line": 19,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/index-C-187lf0.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/index-C-187lf0.js:366`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/index-C-187lf0.js"
},
"evidence": "n u(){try{const d=await fetch(\"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CodeGraphContext/CodeGraphContext/main/README.md\");if(!",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/codegraphcontext/viz/dist/assets/index-C-187lf0.js",
"line": 366,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/codegraphcontext/tools/languages/dart.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/codegraphcontext/tools/languages/dart.py:41`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/codegraphcontext/tools/languages/dart.py"
},
"evidence": "(library_import) @import (library_export) @import \"\"\", \"calls\": \"\"\" (selector",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/codegraphcontext/tools/languages/dart.py",
"line": 41,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/codegraphcontext/tools/tree_sitter_parser.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/codegraphcontext/tools/tree_sitter_parser.py:60`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/codegraphcontext/tools/tree_sitter_parser.py"
},
"evidence": "_name] module = __import__( f\"{__package__}{module_path}\".replace(\"/\", \".\"), fromlist=[c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/codegraphcontext/tools/tree_sitter_parser.py",
"line": 60,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_issue_806_fix.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_issue_806_fix.py:480`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_issue_806_fix.py"
},
"evidence": "\") \"\"\" result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-c\", code], capture_output=True,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_issue_806_fix.py",
"line": 480,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "fd7d777eda616aec3a130d68cbbb89f175d584259b619be7988b05a0addba3a0",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 13,
"medium": 3,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}