Codedev MCP Server
codedev-mcp
npm
v3.2.5
Source verified
Published by kranthithota — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Universal code development MCP server — search, analyze, navigate, review any codebase. 29 tools, semantic search, AST parsing, security scanning, dead code detection, complexity heatmaps, DB schema parsing, API discovery, IaC analysis, CI/CD parsing, mon
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 6 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 15
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/analyzers/security.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/analyzers/security.js:188`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ol' }, { file: 'id_rsa', message: 'Private SSH key should not be in repository' }, { file: 'id_ed25519',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/analyzers/security.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/analyzers/security.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/analyzers/security.js:73`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: name: 'Dangerous eval() usage', category: 'injection', severity: 'high', pattern: /\beval
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/analyzers/security.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/analyzers/branch-compare.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/analyzers/branch-compare.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const exec = promisify(execFile); /** *
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/analyzers/branch-compare.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/analyzers/dep-vuln.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/analyzers/dep-vuln.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/analyzers/dep-vuln.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/analyzers/git.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/analyzers/git.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/analyzers/git.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/resources/health.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/resources/health.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/resources/health.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/search/fast-search.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/search/fast-search.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promise
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/search/fast-search.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/fallback.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/fallback.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { readdir, readFile } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { join } from 'node
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/fallback.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/git-hooks.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/git-hooks.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promise
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/git-hooks.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/utils/fallback.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/fallback.js:21`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } try { execSync(`which ${binary}`, { stdio: 'pipe' }); binaryCache.set(binary, true); r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/fallback.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/utils/plugins.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/plugins.js:51`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: importedModule = await import(entryPoint); module = importedModule; }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/plugins.js
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "read_files"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "read_files" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool read_files · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "max_lines_per_file" on "read_files"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "read_files" takes a path parameter "max_lines_per_file" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool read_files · inputSchema.properties.max_lines_per_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "directory" on "file_tree"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "file_tree" takes a path parameter "directory" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool file_tree · inputSchema.properties.directory
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"codedev-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package codedev-mcp
Tools 42
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
file_treereads sensitive dataread_filesreads sensitive dataanalyze_fileno sensitive capabilityapi_contractsno sensitive capabilityarchitecture_checkno sensitive capabilitybranch_compareno sensitive capabilitycall_graphno sensitive capabilitychange_impactno sensitive capabilitycicd_analyzeno sensitive capabilitycode_docsno sensitive capability
Show 32 more tools ↓
code_metricsno sensitive capabilitycodebase_mapno sensitive capabilitydb_schemano sensitive capabilitydep_vuln_scanno sensitive capabilitydependency_graphno sensitive capabilityfind_dead_codeno sensitive capabilityfind_debug_logsno sensitive capabilityfind_duplicatesno sensitive capabilityfind_empty_catchesno sensitive capabilityfind_large_filesno sensitive capabilityfind_long_functionsno sensitive capabilityfind_referencesno sensitive capabilityfind_secretsno sensitive capabilityfind_todosno sensitive capabilitygit_blameno sensitive capabilitygit_branchesno sensitive capabilitygit_contributorsno sensitive capabilitygit_diffno sensitive capabilitygit_hooksno sensitive capabilitygit_logno sensitive capabilitygit_showno sensitive capabilitygit_statusno sensitive capabilityiac_analyzeno sensitive capabilitymonorepo_analyzeno sensitive capabilitynotebook_analyzeno sensitive capabilityperf_profileno sensitive capabilityscaffoldno sensitive capabilitysearch_codeno sensitive capabilitysearch_symbolsno sensitive capabilitysecurity_scanno sensitive capabilitysemantic_searchno sensitive capabilitytest_coverageno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.2.5 latest |
B 87/100 | 15 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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