Code Context Engine MCP Server
code-context-engine
PyPI
v0.4.26
Published by elara-labs — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
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The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/context_engine/indexer/secrets.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/context_engine/indexer/secrets.py:36`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e _SECRET_PREFIXES) ".npmrc", ".pypirc", ".netrc", # Cloud / infra "credentials.json", "credentials.yaml", "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/context_engine/indexer/secrets.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/context_engine/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/context_engine/cli.py:2739`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .echo("") result = subprocess.run(upgrade_cmd, capture_output=True, text=True) if result.returncode != 0:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/context_engine/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/context_engine/indexer/git_hooks.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/context_engine/indexer/git_hooks.py:83`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "diff", "--name-only", "HEAD~1", "HEAD"], captur
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/context_engine/indexer/git_hooks.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/context_engine/integration/git_context.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/context_engine/integration/git_context.py:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "--is-inside-work-tree"], cwd=proje
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/context_engine/integration/git_context.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/context_engine/services.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/context_engine/services.py:125`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["pgrep", "-f", "cce serve"], capture_output=True, text=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/context_engine/services.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/context_engine/cli.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/context_engine/cli.py:2119`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: for b in __import__( "context_engine.memory.db", fromlist=["BUCKETS"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/context_engine/cli.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_real_life.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_real_life.py:50`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: proper git repo.""" subprocess.run(["git", "init"], cwd=tmp_path, capture_output=True) subprocess.run(["git", "c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_real_life.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_services.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_services.py:67`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ash. """ proc = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-c", "pass"]) proc.wait() assert _process_alive(proc.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_services.py
Tools 11
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
context_searchno sensitive capabilityexpand_chunkno sensitive capabilityindex_statusno sensitive capabilityrecord_code_areano sensitive capabilityrecord_decisionno sensitive capabilityreindexno sensitive capabilityrelated_contextno sensitive capabilitysession_eventno sensitive capabilitysession_recallno sensitive capabilitysession_timelineno sensitive capability
Show 1 more tool ↓
set_output_compressionno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (11 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.26 latest |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.4.25 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan code-context-engine --online --registry pypiMore in Data Science & ML
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