Clouvel MCP Server
clouvel
PyPI
v6.2.1
Published by whitening-sinabro — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([list_files]) and tools that can send data out ([spawn_explore, spawn_librarian]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [list_files] → sinks [spawn_explore, spawn_librarian]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow list_files → spawn_explore
high Tool "spawn_explore" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "spawn_explore" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool spawn_explore
high Tool "spawn_librarian" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "spawn_librarian" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool spawn_librarian
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/clouvel/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/clouvel/cli.py:202`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: check_result = subprocess.run( ["claude", "mcp", "list"], capture_output=True
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/clouvel/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/clouvel/tools/architecture.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/clouvel/tools/architecture.py:69`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 색 grep_result = subprocess.run( ["grep", "-rn", f"(def|class) {name}", str(project_path / "src")],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/clouvel/tools/architecture.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/clouvel/tools/checkpoint.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/clouvel/tools/checkpoint.py:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: name branch = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD"], capture_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/clouvel/tools/checkpoint.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/clouvel/tools/core.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/clouvel/tools/core.py:266`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: new) result = subprocess.run( ["git", "diff", "--name-only", "--diff-filter=A", "HEAD"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/clouvel/tools/core.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/clouvel/tools/install.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/clouvel/tools/install.py:34`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["claude", "--version"], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/clouvel/tools/install.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/clouvel/tools/ship_pro.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/clouvel/tools/ship_pro.py:242`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ue 필요 result = subprocess.run( command, cwd=str(project_path), shell=Tru
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/clouvel/tools/ship_pro.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/clouvel/version_check.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/clouvel/version_check.py:37`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: sts response = requests.get( "https://pypi.org/pypi/clouvel/json", timeout=5
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/clouvel/version_check.py
low Mutating tool "spawn_explore" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "spawn_explore" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool spawn_explore
low Mutating tool "spawn_librarian" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "spawn_librarian" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool spawn_librarian
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "list_files"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "list_files" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool list_files · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 88
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
list_filesreads sensitive dataspawn_exploreruns code / shellspawn_librarianruns code / shellactivate_licenseno sensitive capabilityadd_persona_overrideno sensitive capabilityadd_ruleno sensitive capabilityanalyze_docsno sensitive capabilityarch_checkno sensitive capabilityarchive_projectno sensitive capabilityaudit_rulesno sensitive capability
Show 78 more tools ↓
auto_remindno sensitive capabilitycan_codeno sensitive capabilitycheck_duplicatesno sensitive capabilitycheck_importsno sensitive capabilitycheck_syncno sensitive capabilityconfigure_meetingno sensitive capabilitycontext_loadno sensitive capabilitycontext_saveno sensitive capabilitydebug_runtimeno sensitive capabilitydecide_winnerno sensitive capabilitydisable_ab_testingno sensitive capabilitydrift_checkno sensitive capabilityenable_ab_testingno sensitive capabilityerror_checkno sensitive capabilityerror_learnno sensitive capabilityerror_recordno sensitive capabilityexport_training_datano sensitive capabilityfull_shipno sensitive capabilitygateno sensitive capabilityget_ab_reportno sensitive capabilityget_analyticsno sensitive capabilityget_contextno sensitive capabilityget_meeting_configno sensitive capabilityget_meeting_statsno sensitive capabilityget_monthly_reportno sensitive capabilityget_prd_guideno sensitive capabilityget_prd_templateno sensitive capabilityget_ruleno sensitive capabilityget_setup_guideno sensitive capabilityget_variant_performanceno sensitive capabilityget_verify_checklistno sensitive capabilityhandoffno sensitive capabilityhook_designno sensitive capabilityhook_verifyno sensitive capabilityinit_clouvelno sensitive capabilityinit_docsno sensitive capabilityinit_knowledgeno sensitive capabilityinit_planningno sensitive capabilityinit_rulesno sensitive capabilitylicense_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_locked_decisionsno sensitive capabilitylist_managersno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_variantsno sensitive capabilitymanagerno sensitive capabilitymeetingno sensitive capabilitymeeting_topicsno sensitive capabilitymemory_archiveno sensitive capabilitymemory_global_searchno sensitive capabilitymemory_listno sensitive capabilitymemory_promoteno sensitive capabilitymemory_reportno sensitive capabilitymemory_searchno sensitive capabilitymemory_statusno sensitive capabilitypattern_watchno sensitive capabilityplanno sensitive capabilityquick_perspectivesno sensitive capabilityquick_shipno sensitive capabilityrate_meetingno sensitive capabilityrebuild_indexno sensitive capabilityrecord_decisionno sensitive capabilityrecord_fileno sensitive capabilityrecord_locationno sensitive capabilityrefresh_goalsno sensitive capabilityreset_meeting_configno sensitive capabilitysave_findingno sensitive capabilitysave_prdno sensitive capabilityscan_docsno sensitive capabilitysearch_knowledgeno sensitive capabilityset_project_domainno sensitive capabilitysetup_clino sensitive capabilityshipno sensitive capabilitystartno sensitive capabilityunlock_decisionno sensitive capabilityupdate_progressno sensitive capabilityverifyno sensitive capabilitywrite_prd_sectionno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (88 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v6.2.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 13 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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