Cloudbase MCP Server
@cloudbase/cloudbase-mcp
npm
v2.33.0
Source verified
Published by tencentcloudbase — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
腾讯云开发 MCP Server，通过AI提示词和MCP协议+云开发，让开发更智能、更高效,当你在Cursor/ VSCode GitHub Copilot/WinSurf/CodeBuddy/Augment Code/Claude Code等AI编程工具里写代码时，它能自动帮你生成可直接部署的前后端应用+小程序，并一键发布到腾讯云开发 CloudBase。
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/931.index.cjs)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/931.index.cjs:2845`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nc var deprecatedfn = new Function('fn', 'log', 'deprecate', 'message', 'site', '"use strict"\n' + 'return fun
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/931.index.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/267.index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/267.index.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require__(3782)); const child_process_1 = __webpack_require__(5814); const open_1 = __importDefault(__webpack_require__(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/267.index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/880.index.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/880.index.cjs:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: equire__(81630)); const child_process_1 = __webpack_require__(79646); const open_1 = __importDefault(__webpack_require__
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/880.index.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/931.index.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/931.index.cjs:27270`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cess" var external_node_child_process_ = __webpack_require__(60636); // EXTERNAL MODULE: external "node:fs/promises" var
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/931.index.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: WEBPACK_EXTERNAL_MODULE_child_process__ from "child_process"; import * as __WEBPACK_EXTERNAL_MODULE_crypto__ from "crypt
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.33.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.32.5 |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v2.32.4 |
A 94/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v2.32.3 |
A 94/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v2.32.0 |
A 94/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v2.31.0 |
A 94/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v2.28.1 |
A 94/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
v2.28.0 |
A 94/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v2.27.0 |
A 94/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v2.26.0 |
A 94/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @cloudbase/cloudbase-mcp --onlineMore in AI & Agents
Authenticated MCP transport with HTTP Signatures for AAuth agents
Local-first MCP server for parallel AI coding agents to claim file ownership before edits, preventing stomping on each other in the same worktree.
Agent-agnostic intercommunication system — sessions, messaging, channels, shared state, and real-time events
MCP server for AI agent task communication and delegation with diagnostic lifecycle visibility
Programmatic add/link/unlink for MCP servers across 23 AI coding agents (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Zed, Cline, OpenCode, Goose, Kiro, Windsurf, and more). Functional API with dry-run support.
MCP server layer exposing agent-mesh orchestrator as an MCP agent