Clockify (tracegazer) MCP Server

clockify-mcp PyPI v0.3.2

Published by tracegazer — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

Full-coverage Clockify MCP — 112 tools across 18 domains (incl. invoices, scheduling, time-off & approvals), native OpenTelemetry observability, and a 3-tier read/time-tracking/full access model.

Trust grade
A
96/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 96/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 96/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([download_expense_receipt]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook, generate_webhook_token]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [download_expense_receipt] → sinks [create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook, generate_webhook_token]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow download_expense_receipt → create_webhook

Tools 112

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • create_webhooknetwork egress
  • delete_webhooknetwork egress
  • download_expense_receiptingests untrusted input
  • generate_webhook_tokennetwork egress
  • update_webhooknetwork egress
  • add_invoice_itemno sensitive capability
  • add_invoice_paymentno sensitive capability
  • approve_time_off_requestno sensitive capability
  • archive_expense_categoryno sensitive capability
  • bulk_update_time_entriesno sensitive capability
Show 102 more tools ↓
  • change_invoice_statusno sensitive capability
  • copy_assignmentno sensitive capability
  • create_assignmentno sensitive capability
  • create_clientno sensitive capability
  • create_expenseno sensitive capability
  • create_expense_categoryno sensitive capability
  • create_holidayno sensitive capability
  • create_invoiceno sensitive capability
  • create_projectno sensitive capability
  • create_shared_reportno sensitive capability
  • create_tagno sensitive capability
  • create_taskno sensitive capability
  • create_time_entryno sensitive capability
  • create_time_entry_for_userno sensitive capability
  • create_time_off_policyno sensitive capability
  • create_time_off_requestno sensitive capability
  • create_workspace_custom_fieldno sensitive capability
  • delete_assignmentno sensitive capability
  • delete_clientno sensitive capability
  • delete_expenseno sensitive capability
  • delete_expense_categoryno sensitive capability
  • delete_holidayno sensitive capability
  • delete_invoiceno sensitive capability
  • delete_invoice_paymentno sensitive capability
  • delete_projectno sensitive capability
  • delete_shared_reportno sensitive capability
  • delete_tagno sensitive capability
  • delete_taskno sensitive capability
  • delete_time_entryno sensitive capability
  • delete_workspace_custom_fieldno sensitive capability
  • duplicate_invoiceno sensitive capability
  • duplicate_time_entryno sensitive capability
  • export_reportno sensitive capability
  • find_user_team_managerno sensitive capability
  • generate_attendance_reportno sensitive capability
  • generate_detailed_reportno sensitive capability
  • generate_expense_reportno sensitive capability
  • generate_summary_reportno sensitive capability
  • generate_weekly_reportno sensitive capability
  • get_clientno sensitive capability
  • get_current_userno sensitive capability
  • get_expenseno sensitive capability
  • get_invoiceno sensitive capability
  • get_invoice_paymentsno sensitive capability
  • get_projectno sensitive capability
  • get_project_scheduling_totalsno sensitive capability
  • get_shared_reportno sensitive capability
  • get_tagno sensitive capability
  • get_taskno sensitive capability
  • get_time_entryno sensitive capability
  • get_time_off_policyno sensitive capability
  • get_user_member_profileno sensitive capability
  • get_user_scheduling_totalsno sensitive capability
  • get_webhookno sensitive capability
  • get_webhook_logsno sensitive capability
  • get_workspaceno sensitive capability
  • import_invoice_itemsno sensitive capability
  • list_approval_requestsno sensitive capability
  • list_clientsno sensitive capability
  • list_expense_categoriesno sensitive capability
  • list_expensesno sensitive capability
  • list_holidaysno sensitive capability
  • list_holidays_in_periodno sensitive capability
  • list_invoicesno sensitive capability
  • list_project_custom_fieldsno sensitive capability
  • list_projectsno sensitive capability
  • list_scheduled_assignmentsno sensitive capability
  • list_shared_reportsno sensitive capability
  • list_tagsno sensitive capability
  • list_tasksno sensitive capability
  • list_time_entriesno sensitive capability
  • list_time_off_balances_by_policyno sensitive capability
  • list_time_off_balances_by_userno sensitive capability
  • list_time_off_policiesno sensitive capability
  • list_time_off_requestsno sensitive capability
  • list_user_groupsno sensitive capability
  • list_usersno sensitive capability
  • list_webhooksno sensitive capability
  • list_workspace_custom_fieldsno sensitive capability
  • list_workspacesno sensitive capability
  • publish_assignmentsno sensitive capability
  • reject_time_off_requestno sensitive capability
  • remove_project_custom_fieldno sensitive capability
  • resubmit_approval_entriesno sensitive capability
  • set_project_custom_fieldno sensitive capability
  • stop_running_timerno sensitive capability
  • submit_approval_requestno sensitive capability
  • submit_approval_request_for_userno sensitive capability
  • update_approval_requestno sensitive capability
  • update_assignmentno sensitive capability
  • update_clientno sensitive capability
  • update_expenseno sensitive capability
  • update_expense_categoryno sensitive capability
  • update_holidayno sensitive capability
  • update_invoiceno sensitive capability
  • update_projectno sensitive capability
  • update_shared_reportno sensitive capability
  • update_tagno sensitive capability
  • update_taskno sensitive capability
  • update_time_entryno sensitive capability
  • update_workspace_custom_fieldno sensitive capability
  • withdraw_time_off_requestno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.3.2 latest A 96/100 1 1.13.0 2026-08-25

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 96/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan clockify-mcp --online --registry pypi

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Clockify 10

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 11 side by side →

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