Raw scan report

Clio Kit — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.5.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "clio-kit",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "clio-kit"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "clio-kit"
    }
  },
  "grade": "C",
  "score": {
    "score": 72,
    "threatScore": 83,
    "grade": "C",
    "band": "C",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 15.4,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 2.1,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
        "category": "injection",
        "severity": "high",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 22,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 15.4
      },
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
        "category": "supply-chain",
        "severity": "low",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 3,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 2.1
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "high",
        "label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 6
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "none",
        "label": "publisher verification (none) — trust in the source of the package",
        "appliedPenalty": 5
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.5"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "reads sensitive or local data",
      "has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
      "can execute shell commands or code"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "sensitive-source",
      "code-exec"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": false,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
      "title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (clio-kit-mcp-servers/jarvis/src/jarvis_mcp/capabilities/jarvis_handler.py)",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`clio-kit-mcp-servers/jarvis/src/jarvis_mcp/capabilities/jarvis_handler.py:2153`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/jarvis/src/jarvis_mcp/capabilities/jarvis_handler.py"
      },
      "evidence": "dict(os.environ)",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
        "file": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/jarvis/src/jarvis_mcp/capabilities/jarvis_handler.py",
        "line": 2153
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
      "title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (clio-kit-mcp-servers/spack/src/spack_mcp/backend.py)",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`clio-kit-mcp-servers/spack/src/spack_mcp/backend.py:420`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/spack/src/spack_mcp/backend.py"
      },
      "evidence": "dict(os.environ)",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
        "file": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/spack/src/spack_mcp/backend.py",
        "line": 420
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
      "title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (clio-kit-mcp-servers/hdf5/src/hdf5_mcp/server.py)",
      "category": "injection",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`clio-kit-mcp-servers/hdf5/src/hdf5_mcp/server.py:909`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/hdf5/src/hdf5_mcp/server.py"
      },
      "evidence": "eval(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
        "file": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/hdf5/src/hdf5_mcp/server.py",
        "line": 909
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
      "title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (clio-kit-mcp-servers/hdf5/src/hdf5_mcp/server.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`clio-kit-mcp-servers/hdf5/src/hdf5_mcp/server.py:909`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/hdf5/src/hdf5_mcp/server.py"
      },
      "evidence": "eval(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
        "file": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/hdf5/src/hdf5_mcp/server.py",
        "line": 909
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (clio-agentic-search/src/clio_agentic_search/tasks.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`clio-agentic-search/src/clio_agentic_search/tasks.py:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "clio-agentic-search/src/clio_agentic_search/tasks.py"
      },
      "evidence": "subprocess.run(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "clio-agentic-search/src/clio_agentic_search/tasks.py",
        "line": 9
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (clio-kit-mcp-servers/chronolog/src/chronomcp/utils/helpers.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`clio-kit-mcp-servers/chronolog/src/chronomcp/utils/helpers.py:34`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/chronolog/src/chronomcp/utils/helpers.py"
      },
      "evidence": "subprocess.run(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/chronolog/src/chronomcp/utils/helpers.py",
        "line": 34
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (clio-kit-mcp-servers/jarvis/scripts/live_ares_semantic_mcp_probe.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`clio-kit-mcp-servers/jarvis/scripts/live_ares_semantic_mcp_probe.py:36`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/jarvis/scripts/live_ares_semantic_mcp_probe.py"
      },
      "evidence": "subprocess.Popen(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/jarvis/scripts/live_ares_semantic_mcp_probe.py",
        "line": 36
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (clio-kit-mcp-servers/jarvis/src/jarvis_mcp/capabilities/jarvis_handler.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`clio-kit-mcp-servers/jarvis/src/jarvis_mcp/capabilities/jarvis_handler.py:2252`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/jarvis/src/jarvis_mcp/capabilities/jarvis_handler.py"
      },
      "evidence": "subprocess.Popen(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/jarvis/src/jarvis_mcp/capabilities/jarvis_handler.py",
        "line": 2252
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (clio-kit-mcp-servers/jarvis/src/jarvis_mcp/windows_job.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`clio-kit-mcp-servers/jarvis/src/jarvis_mcp/windows_job.py:99`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/jarvis/src/jarvis_mcp/windows_job.py"
      },
      "evidence": "subprocess.Popen(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/jarvis/src/jarvis_mcp/windows_job.py",
        "line": 99
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (clio-kit-mcp-servers/ndp/src/ndp_mcp/server.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`clio-kit-mcp-servers/ndp/src/ndp_mcp/server.py:167`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/ndp/src/ndp_mcp/server.py"
      },
      "evidence": "subprocess.run(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/ndp/src/ndp_mcp/server.py",
        "line": 167
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (clio-kit-mcp-servers/node-hardware/src/node_hardware_mcp/capabilities/remote_node_info.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`clio-kit-mcp-servers/node-hardware/src/node_hardware_mcp/capabilities/remote_node_info.py:216`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/node-hardware/src/node_hardware_mcp/capabilities/remote_node_info.py"
      },
      "evidence": "subprocess.run(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/node-hardware/src/node_hardware_mcp/capabilities/remote_node_info.py",
        "line": 216
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (clio-kit-mcp-servers/node-hardware/src/node_hardware_mcp/capabilities/utils.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`clio-kit-mcp-servers/node-hardware/src/node_hardware_mcp/capabilities/utils.py:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/node-hardware/src/node_hardware_mcp/capabilities/utils.py"
      },
      "evidence": "subprocess.run(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/node-hardware/src/node_hardware_mcp/capabilities/utils.py",
        "line": 35
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (clio-kit-mcp-servers/paraview/scripts/automate_setup.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`clio-kit-mcp-servers/paraview/scripts/automate_setup.py:52`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/paraview/scripts/automate_setup.py"
      },
      "evidence": "subprocess.Popen(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/paraview/scripts/automate_setup.py",
        "line": 52
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (clio-kit-mcp-servers/paraview/scripts/build_paraview.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`clio-kit-mcp-servers/paraview/scripts/build_paraview.py:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/paraview/scripts/build_paraview.py"
      },
      "evidence": "subprocess.run(",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "clio-kit-mcp-servers/paraview/scripts/build_paraview.py",
        "line": 23
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
      "title": "Package has no source repository",
      "category": "supply-chain",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "\"clio-kit\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
      "remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "package",
        "name": "clio-kit"
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [],
  "surfaceDigest": "4fc05876ed27c34e4176b1c0ef4d023c6f137a692fdd9ad1cb592f6fb5d6ef78",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 0,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 14,
      "medium": 0,
      "low": 1,
      "info": 0
    }
  }
}