Cli Bridge (JoaoBerne) MCP Server
cli-bridge-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.5
Published by joaoberne — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Consult a council of AI CLIs (Gemini, GPT, Claude, Mistral, Qwen, Copilot, OpenCode…) from inside any MCP client — free and ban-safe.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/cli_bridge/workflows.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/cli_bridge/workflows.py:161`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s*\("), "high", "Use of eval()", "eval on untrusted input is arbitrary code execution; parse explicitly instead."),
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli_bridge/workflows.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli_bridge/budget.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli_bridge/budget.py:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: vailable never blocks a spawn (the gates fail open, not closed: a broken local sqlite must not take the council down). F
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli_bridge/budget.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli_bridge/buildloop.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli_bridge/buildloop.py:197`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: zone_label} p = subprocess.run(list(dod_cmd), cwd=target_dir, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli_bridge/buildloop.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli_bridge/lanes.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli_bridge/lanes.py:548`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run([bin_name, "models"], capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli_bridge/lanes.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli_bridge/reports.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli_bridge/reports.py:213`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: LY_LIMIT is enforced at spawn (any lane). " "_CREDITS_PER_1K makes CLI_BRIDGE_DAILY_CREDIT_CAP enforcea
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli_bridge/reports.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli_bridge/runner.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli_bridge/runner.py:114`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: if _IS_WINDOWS: subprocess.run(["taskkill", "/F", "/T", "/PID", str(pid)], capture_output
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli_bridge/runner.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli_bridge/workflows.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli_bridge/workflows.py:58`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( ["git", "-C", cwd or ".", "diff", base], capture_output=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli_bridge/workflows.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli_bridge/worktrees.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli_bridge/worktrees.py:41`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ]: try: p = subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli_bridge/worktrees.py
Tools 35
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
job_resultingests untrusted inputask_allno sensitive capabilityask_all_asyncno sensitive capabilityask_bestno sensitive capabilityask_buildno sensitive capabilityask_build_isolatedno sensitive capabilityask_cascadeno sensitive capabilitybatch_runno sensitive capabilitybuild_steerno sensitive capabilitychallengeno sensitive capability
Show 25 more tools ↓
commit_msgno sensitive capabilityconsensusno sensitive capabilityconversation_showno sensitive capabilityconversations_listno sensitive capabilitydebateno sensitive capabilitydoctorno sensitive capabilityjob_cancelno sensitive capabilityjob_statusno sensitive capabilityjob_tailno sensitive capabilityjobs_listno sensitive capabilitylane_statsno sensitive capabilitylist_modelsno sensitive capabilitypr_describeno sensitive capabilitypremortemno sensitive capabilityrate_laneno sensitive capabilityreset_lane_stateno sensitive capabilityreview_diffno sensitive capabilityroute_planno sensitive capabilitysecurity_reviewno sensitive capabilityset_lane_costno sensitive capabilitysetupno sensitive capabilitytest_planno sensitive capabilityusage_budgetno sensitive capabilityusage_reportno sensitive capabilityworkflowno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (35 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.5 latest |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.1.4 |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan cli-bridge-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Cli Bridge 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
MCP-CLI Bridge - Call CLI tools through MCP protocol
[](https://www.npmjs.com/package/cli-bridge) [](https://github.com/walkindude/cli-bridge/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
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