Claude Plugin Kubernetes MCP Server
claude-plugin-kubernetes
PyPI
v0.2.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([k8s_list_secrets]) and tools that can send data out ([k8s_exec]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [k8s_list_secrets] → sinks [k8s_exec]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow k8s_list_secrets → k8s_exec
high Tool "k8s_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "k8s_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool k8s_exec
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "k8s_exec"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "k8s_exec" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool k8s_exec · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "k8s_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "k8s_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool k8s_exec
Tools 50
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
k8s_execruns code / shellk8s_list_secretsreads sensitive datak8s_api_resourcesno sensitive capabilityk8s_apply_manifestno sensitive capabilityk8s_cluster_infono sensitive capabilityk8s_delete_podno sensitive capabilityk8s_delete_resourceno sensitive capabilityk8s_describeno sensitive capabilityk8s_diffno sensitive capabilityk8s_find_issuesno sensitive capability
Show 40 more tools ↓
k8s_getno sensitive capabilityk8s_get_configmap_datano sensitive capabilityk8s_get_contextsno sensitive capabilityk8s_get_yamlno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_configmapsno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_cronjobsno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_daemonsetsno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_deploymentsno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_eventsno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_hpano sensitive capabilityk8s_list_imagesno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_ingressesno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_jobsno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_limitrangesno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_namespacesno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_networkpoliciesno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_nodesno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_poddisruptionbudgetsno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_podsno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_pvcsno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_pvsno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_resourcequotasno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_rolebindingsno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_rolesno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_serviceaccountsno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_servicesno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_statefulsetsno sensitive capabilityk8s_list_storageclassesno sensitive capabilityk8s_logsno sensitive capabilityk8s_logs_selectorno sensitive capabilityk8s_node_operationno sensitive capabilityk8s_patch_resourceno sensitive capabilityk8s_restart_deploymentno sensitive capabilityk8s_rollback_deploymentno sensitive capabilityk8s_rollout_historyno sensitive capabilityk8s_rollout_statusno sensitive capabilityk8s_scaleno sensitive capabilityk8s_self_testno sensitive capabilityk8s_top_nodesno sensitive capabilityk8s_top_podsno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (50 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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