Claude Playwright MCP Server
claude-playwright
npm
v0.1.4
Published by smartlabsat — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Seamless integration between Claude Code and Playwright MCP for efficient browser automation and testing
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/index.js:937`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: childProcess = require("child_process"); var path8 = require("path"); var fs8 = require("fs"); var process2
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/index.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/index.mjs:942`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ildProcess = __require("child_process"); var path8 = __require("path"); var fs8 = __require("fs"); var proce
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/index.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/generators/init.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/generators/init.js:120`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: > __importStar(require('child_process'))); return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { const npm = spawn('npm'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/generators/init.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/generators/mcp-setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/generators/mcp-setup.js:94`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); execSync('which claude', { stdio: 'ignore' }); console.log(chal
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/generators/mcp-setup.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"claude-playwright" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package claude-playwright
Tools 26
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browser_adapt_testno sensitive capabilitybrowser_cache_statusno sensitive capabilitybrowser_clickno sensitive capabilitybrowser_closeno sensitive capabilitybrowser_console_messagesno sensitive capabilitybrowser_delete_testno sensitive capabilitybrowser_evaluateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_fill_formno sensitive capabilitybrowser_find_similar_testsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_hoverno sensitive capability
Show 16 more tools ↓
browser_navigateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_network_requestsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_press_keyno sensitive capabilitybrowser_run_testno sensitive capabilitybrowser_save_testno sensitive capabilitybrowser_screenshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_select_optionno sensitive capabilitybrowser_session_listno sensitive capabilitybrowser_session_restoreno sensitive capabilitybrowser_session_saveno sensitive capabilitybrowser_snapshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_suggest_actionsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_test_libraryno sensitive capabilitybrowser_typeno sensitive capabilitybrowser_wait_forno sensitive capabilityprotocol_validation_statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.4 latest |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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